The army is undertaking counter insurgency under adverse conditions

Asif Haroon Raja

It is a recorded fact of history that insurgency originates and flourishes in areas suffering from prolonged injustices, deprivation and dejection. Historically, mostly disgruntled or greedy persons desirous of uplifting their fortunes through shortcuts, or those with some social or political standing having been victimized by state authorities genuinely or unjustly and vying to settle scores with their oppressors decide to pick up arms against the state. Failing to quench their thirst for social upward mobility or to take revenge at their own, they are on the lookout for those who can help them in achieving their grand plans of opulence or in settling scores. They indulge in day-dreaming and in never-ending conspiracies in pursuit of their selfish interests. Such persons are hunted by foreign agencies and trapped.

Insurgency cannot succeed unless it has a superior cause, effective leadership, support of local population, safe havens both inside and outside the country, and regular supply of munitions and funds from abroad and local resources. To win support of locals, insurgent leaders play upon social, political, religious, economic grievances and high-handedness and insensitivity of the ruling class. They promote misgivings and keep adding to their sense of frustrations and despondency till they inculcate in them feelings of hatred and revenge against the rulers. They invoke hope of better tomorrow in them by leading them up the garden path. They impress upon them that for the achievement of their rightful rights and equitable justice, they will have to render sacrifices and show unity of action.  Those not falling in line are coerced through brutal tactics.

War on terror fought by Pak army is not an ordinary asymmetric war. Majority of militants in western troubled regions are Pakhtuns linked with Pakhtuns of Afghanistan. Many among them have fought the Soviets and US-NATO forces and are battle hardened. The ones who participated in Afghan war in 1980s must be trainers of their grown up sons and wards. They are now fighting Pak army since 2003. They enjoy distinct advantages of home ground where they have hideouts in high mountains and safe exit and supply routes. In the war against Soviets, Mujahideen were trained and equipped by CIA and ISI. This time, militants have five patrons (CIA, RAW, Mossad, MI-6, RAAM). Mentors are providing them intimate training, funds, war munitions, communications and technology. Battle preparations had commenced in real earnest in 2003-4. Out of $3 trillion earned from drug trade in Afghanistan each year, 10% has been earmarked for covert operations in Pakistan.

In all the mountainous patches of seven tribal agencies of FATA, Darra and Malakand Division, deep tunnels measuring ten feet wide, 12 feet deep and 50-100 ft long were dug. These as well as caves were used to store arms, ammunition and explosives and also to use them for hiding purposes. Underground laboratories for making explosive devices and training areas with requisite training aids and firing ranges to train fresh recruits were found in Swat. Fortified command HQs were established at unassailable vantage points to exercise effective command and control. The command HQ of Fazlullah at Peuchar was so thoroughly fortified that it took the elite commandos 16 days to clear it. The militants have a large variety of weapons comprising 107mm guns, 14.5mm guns, 12.7mm ack ack guns, AK rifles, American M-4 rifles, Israeli sniper rifles, MGs, LMGs, mines and all variety of explosives including RDX. Ammunition is mostly of Russian and Indian origin. They have latest walkie-talkie wireless sets, Thoraya satellite sets, jammers, anti-jamming devices and sacks of dollars.

Other than locals, fighters belong to Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, India, Arab and African countries. Foreigners have been properly integrated with local militants and attuned to fight in mountainous areas. Militants are not rag-tag fighters but are well-trained, well-equipped, well-funded, thoroughly motivated and well-supervised. Apart from engaging security forces in their home grounds and using locals as human shields, suicide bombers are trained in Afghanistan, in North and South Waziristan and till recent in Swat and launched in major cities against high profile personalities, military targets and important buildings and installations to create fear and anarchy. Purpose of kidnapping is to earn ransom and to get their prisoners released. Besides foreign sponsored internal threat which has now been termed as an existential threat, Pakistan has to contend with treacherous enemy in the east, unfriendly Afghanistan, untrustworthy US-Nato forces based in Afghanistan, hostile Israel which considers nuclear Pakistan is chief threat to its security. Above all, Indo-US-Israeli nexus has chalked out a sinister plan against Pakistan with chief focus on its nuclear arsenal.

Under the given precarious internal and external security situation when seen in the backdrop of leadership crisis, fragile economy and polarized society, the task of the army to conduct counter insurgency operations against insurgents fighting guerrilla warfare becomes all the more challenging and complicated. Its hands get tied when the militants are supported by locals, some political and religious parties/groups and also enjoy sympathies of the public. To make matters worse, it is doubted and ridiculed and subjected to a slanderous campaign by foreign media, US and Indian officials and foreign paid local journalists, analysts and anchors. Army is undertaking counter insurgency under most adverse conditions.        

For the success of military operation, it is absolutely essential to repose full confidence in the army and to gain continued public support. The army must be given sufficient time to prepare itself, operationally, administratively and technically to fight low intensity war. The army was pushed into Malakand Division to confront Taliban challenge on a very short notice. One of the reasons given for undue haste and secrecy was to catch the militants by surprise and thus minimize casualty rate. It is to the great credit of the army to have achieved outstanding results in quick time and paving way for return of IDPs. This practice however should not become a norm since the army needs time to attune itself for following:

One, identify peculiarities of terrain and weather under which insurgents are operating and train and equip the force accordingly.

Two, gather detailed information about the faceless enemy regarding its strengths, motives, motivational nodes on which it brain washes the youth.

Three, find out supply routes, sanctuaries, strongholds, local and foreign support, its organisation and command structure, types of weaponry and communication system it has, existing supply dumps, recruitment areas and their tactics of fighting and logistics.

Four, impart training and equipment to the counter insurgent force in accordance with insurgents force structure and also get the force acclimatized before it is launched.

Five, determine the sources of funding and arms supply. Isolate the insurgents and cutoff all their entry and withdrawal routes including supply lines.

Six, identify weaknesses of the militants and make plans to accentuate them.

Seven, plan to segregate half motivated insurgents and the fence sitters from the hardened ones and win them over..

Eight, locate known leaders of insurgents and track them for elimination.

Nine, make intelligence system effective and free of influence of FBI and CIA.

Ten, establish own contacts, make own routes of supply secure, reassess strength and vulnerabilities of militant and convert strengths into weaknesses and accentuate vulnerabilities.

Eleven, identify and mark all hideouts, strongholds, munitions dumps, training areas for destruction by artillery or air.

Twelve, plan a well tailored psychological operation warfare to win over locals by providing them protection and incentives. Counter the themes played up by clerics and militant leaders to recruit youth in their ranks through ulemas and elders of the area.

Thirteen, make the public aware of the designs of foreign agencies and havoc they have wrought on Pakhtuns in particular and the country in general with the help of quislings.

Fourteen, work out correct distribution of effort to ensue military balance in all sectors.