Military Intervention Appears Inevitable Again

By Usman Khalid, Chairman Rifah Party

http://www.rifah.org/site/military-intervention-appears-inevitable-again/

 Mother of a Shaheed saying farewell to her son symbolises the chasm between civil and military - the huge sacrifices made by the military over ten years of war against insurgency while the politicians humilate soldiers and are busy jockeying for power

The first military intervention took place in Pakistan in 1958. At that time, the 1956 Constitution has been passed by the Constituent Assembly and the first general elections were expected soon. But there was anxiety about the consequence of elections because the Muslim League had been resoundingly beaten in provincial elections in East Pakistan by Jugtu Front led by Maulvi Fazal ul Haq. Although he was the mover of the 1940 Resolution he switched sides and was nominated as a Minister by the Congress Party in the Interim Cabinet of India in 1946. It was thought at the time that making West Pakistan ONE administrative UNIT and giving ‘parity’ in representation to the two wings would deal with the political hiatus. Both measures were enacted but there was more demand from East Pakistan. Bengali was recognised as a ‘state language’ and ‘separate electorate’ was replaced by ‘joint electorate’ in East Pakistan. Joint electorate is associated with ‘secularism’ in India and marked the beginning of rising political influence of India in East Pakistan. Despite theses concessions, the alienation of Bengalis could not be arrested.  

In the fifties several Arab and Muslim countries had experienced coup d’états and rise of popular military leaders. Pakistan followed the trend and in October 1958 the military took over and the Army Chief General Ayub Khan became the President. I wrote an article at the time in support of ‘presidential form of government’. My main argument was that the presidential form tends to consolidate the unity of a federation whereas the parliamentary system promotes centrifugal forces. That must have been the view of the majority because the new constitution promulgated in 1962 changed the system to Presidential form. Presidential elections were held in 1964 which was won by General Ayub Khan even though he was opposed by a revered candidate – Mohtarma Fatima Jinnah. Ayub Khan held the office from 1958 to 1969 and presided over a decade of rapid socio-economic progress raising the profile and prestige of Pakistan. Then he made the same mistake that all ‘popular’ rulers do; he decided to change the rules to give himself another term of five years as President. Country wide demonstrations started providing an opportunity to the Army Chief – General Yahya Khan - to ask him to hand over the reigns of Government to him.

The blunderbuss General abrogated the 1962 Constitution and dissolved the ONE UNIT to restore the four provinces in West Pakistan. These were popular demands voiced by all the ‘experienced politicians’. He did not have a mandate to rule let alone a mandate to abrogate the 1962 Constitution. Fifty years later, my view has been upheld by experience. In the oldest parliamentary democracy – the United Kingdom – Ireland seceded after a bloody civil war a century ago and Scotland is to vote in 2014 if it would secede from the UK. In contrast, presidential democracies have consolidated national unity and flourished. Most of the stable Muslim countries are either monarchies or Presidential democracy. Centrifugal forces have not succeeded even in nascent democracies like Afghanistan and the six Muslim Central Asian Republics that emerged after the break up of the Soviet Union. The “experienced politician” knew that in the parliamentary system the politicians are in control; in the Presidential system the people are.  

Late Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto wanted to continue the presidential system as evidenced by the Interim Constitution he promulgated after his take over in the wake of defeat in 1971 Indo-Pakistan War. But the failure of two Generals – Ayub Khan, and Yahya Khan – in two Indo-Pakistan Wars 1965 and 1971 – and support by the Muslim League and religious political parties to both the Generals allowed the narrative of Pakistan to be written by the opponents of Pakistan. Mr Bhutto understood that absence of reconciliation between the patriotic forces – the Muslim League and religious political parties – would give anti-Pakistan forces the edge. Since Indo-Soviet supported NAP had become his enemies – not just opponents - he offered his hand of friendship to religious political parties. But he was spurned because the USA had started to patronise the Jamaat i Islami and India restored its links with the JUI through Deoband to oppose ZAB led PPP.

 It is my view that the Army Chiefs intervened only when the situation precluded a political solution. In 1958, the polarisation of public opinion was not addressed by the political leaders and the split between East and West Pakistan became unbridgeable. In 1969, the gulf had become even wider; the most popular Party in East Pakistan - the Awami League – was led by an Indian agent, Sheikh Mujib. Elections in such warlike atmosphere could only exacerbate polarisation. In the ‘fairest ever’ elections of 1971 the Awami League won all but one seat in East Pakistan, and Bhutto’s PPP emerged victorious in the Punjab and West Pakistan. The split, however contrived and temporary, was beyond the capability of the politicians to heal or bridge. India had already promised Sheikh Mujib that it would invade East Pakistan to realise its secession if he refused to become the Prime Minister of Pakistan.  After first accepting to form the next Government and then refusing three days later was intended to symbolise Unilateral Declaration of Independence – UDI. It was seen as such by the people in both wings. The massacre of Biharis and gang rape of West Pakistani girl students in Iqbal Hall of Dhaka University left no doubt that an insurrection had begun. The Pakistan Army restored order in about three months but India kept its promise with tacit approval of the USA as well as USSR. The 1971 War was fought in an environment when Pakistan was isolated and friendless in the world.

The Pakistan Army, cut off from its base and supplies for months before the war, could not have won particularly when the territory it was defending had been infiltrated by Bengali Hindus operating as ‘Mukti Bahini’. The invasion by India was preceded by the most elaborate clandestine operation ever. The rest is history. My worry is that Pakistan may well be sleep-walking towards replicating that experience. At that time there was a popular and patriotic leader available in the person of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to gather the pieces and give the country a new Constitution and restore the unity, self-confidence and power of the federation. Today, there is neither public awareness nor the leadership to galvanise the nation to stand up and fight the twin threat of subversion and infiltration.   

The 1973 Constitution was based on the experience of 1971. But the political class and the media has drawn all the wrong lessons. Mr Bhutto had to make compromises that accommodated the ethnic nationalist led by the ANP as well as the religious groups. Both smelt blood and mounted strong opposition to Mr Bhutto. In facing the challenge, the military supported him but the opposition to him came from the most unexpected quarters - the judiciary – which denied him the weapon of law to fight a fitna. In 1977 it was clear that the opposition alliance – the PNA – did not enjoy public support but it was not prepared to accept Bhutto administration for another five years. Thus, there was no alternative to military rule in 1977.

General Zia ul Haq, the Army Chief, understood the dangers that lurked. He thought that removal of Bhutto from the scene for a short period would cool passions and if elections were held a few months after his removal, Prime Minister Bhutto would return to power. I have the account of Zia take over from the person of Late Major General M. Imtiaz Ali - Military Secretary to Prime Minister Bhutto at the time of July 1977 coup d’état.  He told me that during the months after the 1977 Elections; there were several high level meetings to discuss the law and order situation in which General Zia was often present. After each such meeting, Mr Bhutto looked at General Zia and said with a smile, “Then there is always the military option”. No one asked what he meant but General Zia was taking that as a hint. On the night of 4/5 July 1977, when troops of 111 Brigade surrounded the PM House, General Imtiaz was woken up and informed. He put on his uniform and went to the living quarters of the PM. He found Mr Bhutto talking on telephone with General Zia. Mr Bhutto was quite relaxed and he told General Imtiaz that the “military option” had been exercised and that he should accompany him to go to the Prime Minister’s House in Murree the next morning at around 11 o’clock. The troops of 111 Brigade took no action and he did accompany the Prime Minister in uniform in the official car of the PM flying the Pakistan flag. During his stay in the PM House in Murree, Mr Bhutto had his personal staff and ADCs with him. To General Imtiaz, it all appeared to be an ‘arrangement’ which was not verbalised or written down but it was quite clear there was an ‘understanding’.

After General Zia announced the date of fresh elections, he went to Murree and met Prime Minister Bhutto. This meeting was far from cordial. General Zia asked the PM if he was satisfied with his actions. Mr Bhutto told him off saying that he had violated the Constitution and any suggestion of him approving Zia’s actions was ‘absurd’. We know what happened after that. The differences between Mr Bhutto and several judges of high judiciary were cleverly exploited by General Zia to secure the conviction and eventually the execution of the popular Prime Minister. The ‘judicial murder’ of Mr Bhutto underlined the bond between Generals and Judges. But the death of General Zia inn 1988 in an air accident after 11 years of despotic rule had made it impossible for the arrangement to continue. Fresh elections on party basis were held which was won by the PPP under Benazir Bhutto. She lasted as the PM merely two years when dismissed by President GIK for corruption and being a security risk on account of her willingness to submit to US pressure on Pakistan’s nuclear programme. Mian Nawaz Sharif became the new Prime Minister only to be dismissed by GIK in 1993. Benazir was elected the PM once again and dismissed once again this time because of corruption by her husband, Asif Ali Zardari. Nawaz Sharif’s Party won the elections to form a strong government winning 2/3 majority in 1996. He used his strength to tame the military resulting in the resignation of General Jehangir Karamat and appointed General Musharraf as the new Army Chief.

The civil-military honeymoon was disturbed by Kargil operations.  The assumption in Pakistan was that India would put up with incursions in Kargil area as Pakistan had put up with incursions by India in Siachin area. But India decided to escalate the war by introducing its air force for which Pakistan was not ready. Nawaz Sharif and Musharraf have been blaming each other of ‘betrayal’ ever since. Mian Nawaz Sharif compounded his error by trying to dismiss Musharraf when he was in the air returning from a visit to Sri Lanka. The Army as a whole felt betrayed.  Just as a single and personal betrayal by Bhutto of Zia ul Haq resulted in 1977 coup d’état, the betrayal of the Army by Nawaz Sharif resulted in the coup d’état of 1999. The Charter of Democracy signed between Benazir and Nawaz Sharif in London was a charter to ‘saddle’ the judges and generals and break their mutual support. In 1999, the Supreme Court did not only invoke the ‘doctrine of necessity’ to endorse the military take over but also gave Musharraf the authority to rule for three years and make changes to the Constitution. The conventional wisdom at that time was that three months rule by a ‘caretaker administration’ was not long enough to ensure a political shake up to better governance.

General Musharraf proved to be too inept to comprehend his mandate or to deliver. He used the opportunity to prolong his rule by a game of musical chairs between political parties. He ruled for five years after 2002 Elections with the support of PML(Q) and MQM. He secured the support of the PPP, ANP, PML(Q) and MQM in 2008 Elections and hoped to rule for another five years. But politician are better at politics without principles than Generals; Musharraf was manoeuvred out of office while the ‘natural alliance’ of the PPP with PML(Q), MQM and ANP  flourishes.  The game changer that brought about the realignment of forces was the dismissal of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry by Musharraf who feared that that he would NOT endorse his re-election as President in uniform. He was right. In the new situation, the military as well as the media supported the judiciary forcing President Zardari to restore the judges dismissed by Musharraf. But the machination to weaken the military and the judiciary continue. The judiciary has been defied for four years by non-compliance of its decisions. It is also reviled by slanderous attacks by PPP ministers (like Sharjeel Memon) and Senators (like Faisal Raza Abidi). The Arsalan Iftikhar episode alleging huge sums of money being spent by shady developer Malik Riaz to entertain the son of the CJ in London has dampened the alacrity of the CJ. The Chief Justice has not done any good by remarks against the Army which is fighting an unpopular war against foreign supported insurrection in Baluchistan. The natural alliance between the judiciary and the military that filled the vacuum created by arrogance or ineptitude of politicians in the past has broken down. The enthusiasm of high judiciary to enforce the rule of law in visibly waning as the elections draw near. The armed forces personnel are worried that national resolve to defeat the enemy plans to erode the ability of Pakistan to stand up to security challenges is weakening.

The feeling of personal betrayal led to a coup d’état in 1977, betrayal of the Army as an institution led to the coup d’état in 1999; imagine how the men in uniform feel when they see ‘betrayal of the country’ ? The plunder of the state exchequer; the ruination of the economy; de-industrialisation owing to shortage of gas and electricity; worry all citizens equally. But the armed forces have a statutory responsibility to defend the state and have a duty to act if the security of the state is undermined or threatened. The armed forces are handicapped by apparent absence of public support as almost ALL the political parties present themselves as anti-establishment. PML(N) – a pro-establishment party in the past – labours under the effect of ‘betrayal’ in 1999. This is bad for the country. If there is no political party that shares the concerns of the establishment, the security of the state is seriously jeopardised. As for the PPP, it has betrayed the military publicly on several occasions:

1. Announcing that the DG ISI would be sent to India while India was blaming the ISI for the attack in Mumbai in 2008.

2. Placing the ISI under Interior Minister Rehman Malik against who the military have a mile long list of charges of working for foreign intelligence agencies.

3. Kerry Lugar Bill Affair wherein provisions to bring the military under civil ‘control’ were included on the suggestion of Govt. of Pakistan..

4. The infamous ‘Memogate’ affair in which the Army Chief and DG ISI became complainants before the Supreme Court submitting affidavits against Pakistan’s Ambassador in the US who had written a memo requesting the US Government for assistance to reorganise the command structure of Pakistan’s armed forces in exchange for accommodating US concerns about nuclear weapons etc. The initiative could not have come from an Ambassador unless he had the blessing of the President who had been auctioning the nuclear deterrent of Pakistan for 100 Billion Dollars during his visit to the US. This constitutes high treason. The matter is before the Supreme Court but further action is held up because the main accused was allowed by the SC to leave the country.

5. Ajmal Qasab, the only Mumbai terrorists apprehended, tried, convicted and hanged in India, was clearly neither a Muslim nor a Pakistani. The team sent from Pakistan was NOT allowed to interview him. And yet, Interior Minister Rehman Malik has been publicising through electronic media that his police investigators have found that ALL the terrorists in Mumbai attack were Pakistanis and that the police have their handlers and trainers in custody. This is absurd because the boat in which the ‘terrorists’ allegedly travelled from Pakistan was shown on TV to have been found sunk in Pakistani waters. In his regular TV programme Najam Sethi even gave the reason why the ‘establishment’ ordered the attack. He said that President Zardari, contrary to the declared  policy that ‘first strike’ is the nuclear doctrine of Pakistan, said in an interview with Karan Thapar that he could not even “think about ordering a nuclear strike on India”. While Sethi acknowledged it may have been the result of inadequate briefing, he nevertheless opined that the military got so worried, it ordered the attack on Mumbai which scuttled all peace parleys with India. The Sethi explanation is infantile but ‘infantile pronouncements’are good enough for anti-Pakistan propaganda in the equally infantile Press of India and Pakistan. An international storm is brewing up which might blow up after the induction of the new government in Pakistan. Clearly, Rehman Malik is making a case to indict the ISI for Mumbai attack.

The SC Judgment in Asghar Khan Case dealt with three matters:

1. Indictment of two general officers for misconduct.
2. Order to investigate who received how much in that case and to recover the money with interest.
3. Held that the office of the President requires him to be politically neutral and that favouring one party over another is a violation of the Constitution.

I have been saying that if the media focus remains on the first, the result might be unrest among junior ranks and even a mutiny of some sort. There is clearly a deal not to investigate the politicians or to demand that the President resigns and leads the election campaign as the Party Leader. The focus of the press as well as the politicians continues to be on the misconduct of Generals. I am worried because it puts a lot of pressure on the Army Chief General Kayani. He cannot ignore the unrest in the armed forces which is exacerbated by the fact that all the political parties, the media and the high judiciary have ‘anti-establishment’ policies and attitude. The option of a bloodless coup d’état is no longer available. The military can either put up with demonization and humiliation, socio-political chaos, loot and plunder or lead a true revolution. A true revolution: 1) changes the composition of the political class, and 2) change the ownership of means of production – primarily land – to make the country more modern, dynamic and equitable. No political party has a vision anywhere close. I see a military led public revolt to bring about such changes. It would not be a linear progression; it would not be peaceful or straightforward. The involvement of the armed forces, which is the most egalitarian and disciplined organisation in the country, would reduce bloodshed and increase speed of reform. This may be wishful thinking. But I do not expect the present day political parties to speed up socio-economic progress and defend the country at the same time. That is why I hope that the military would overcome the shock of being reviled internally and internationally and come forward to meet the challenge. ++