The Kayani Doctrine

By Dr Farrukh Saleem

http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-9-163138-The-Kayani-doctrine#sthash.WJvVwtsL.dpuf

General Kayani- the Army Chief of Pakistan who gave good advice to help the USA withdraw from Afghanistan smoothly and honourably

 (While Pakistan is preoccupied with elections and rising violence in Karachi and Quetta, the paradigm shift in the US policy on Afghanistan has not been taken much note of. The op-ed below published in ‘The News’ in Pakistan gives an idea that the preparations being made at Karachi Port may well be for the advertised purpose of facilitating withdrawal and narcotics control. + Usman Khalid, Director RIFA+)

The Kayani Doctrine is built on four pillars: 1) American troops would have to withdraw from Afghanistan; 2) reconciliation among Afghan factions is not possible without the ISI; 3) Jalalabad-Torkham-Karachi route remains the most viable for withdrawing American forces: 4) India cannot be allowed to encircle Pakistan.

In 2009, General McChrystal, commander ISAF and of US forces in Afghanistan (USFOR-A), refusing to buy the Kayani Doctrine. He requested a ‘troop surge’ which inducted 30,000-40,000 additional troops into Afghanistan. In 2010, 101st Combat Aviation Brigade, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 187th Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team and the 101st Sustainment Brigade were deployed to Afghanistan.

In 2010, General Petraeus, the new commander ISAF and USFOR-A, also refused to buy the Kayani Doctrine and began to implement his “comprehensive counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy”. General Petraeus’ COIN had four pillars: 1) securing and serving the population, 2) understanding local circumstances, 3) separating irreconcilables from reconcilable; and 4) living among the people”.

By 2011, the cost of war in Afghanistan to the USA reached a colossal $500 billion mark and the US had suffered 1,814 fatalities. By 2011, Petraeus’ four pillars had begun to fall flat – one by one. America could no longer sustain the war in Afghanistan – neither politically nor financially. Finally, President Obama, in a prime time speech, bought into the Kayani Doctrine by announcing a troop drawdown schedule. On December 2, 2012, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton held talks with COAS General Ashfaq Kayani. This may have actually been the first formal buy-in of the Kayani Doctrine.

On December 17, the principal deputy assistant attorney general told a federal court in New York: “In the view of the United States, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is entitled to immunity because it is part of a foreign state within the meaning of the FSIA (Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act).” This may have actually been an implicit acceptance by the US of the ISI’s indispensability in the Afghan endgame (the doctrine’s second pillar).

On December 29, Pakistan received $688 million as Coalition Support Fund (CSF). According to the Ministry of Finance, “from May 2010 onwards Pakistan had asked for $2.5 billion under the CSF but only $1.9 billion have been reimbursed.”

On February 10, “two convoys each hauling 25 shipping containers entered Pakistan at the Chaman and Torkham borders” heading back to where they came from. To be certain, these convoys will be followed by a few thousand taking back around 750,000 major military items valued at close to $40 billion (the doctrine’s third pillar).

Indian defence analysts claim that the British have acted as the intermediaries in the latest US-Pakistan rapprochement and that Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia are also involved in the game. Pakistan is once again becoming the centre piece in the Afghan endgame.

Former Indian diplomat MK Bhadrakumar, who served in Islamabad, Kabul, Tashkent and Moscow, wrote, “Washington is stonewalling India’s requests for the extradition of two key protagonists who are in the US jails – David Headley and Tahawwur Rana” and that “India’s worst fears with regard to the situation in Afghanistan are probably coming true.”

Apparently, India’s dream of encircling Pakistan is evaporating into thin air (the doctrine’s last pillar). In all probability, Pakistan’s security would face bigger challenges after NATO pulls out of Afghanistan. With America gone, militants groups of all hues could team up in an attempt to overwhelm Pakistan. That would need more than doctrine the entire nation needs to be prepared for a situation the taste of which Pakistan is getting in Karachi and Baluchistan. The role and strategy of the military would be crucial to success One hopes that the military is prepared for the contingency.

The writer is a columnist based in Islamabad.