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2013 Elections: price to pay for
ignoring Kashmir and Afghanistan
By
Usman Khalid, April 27, 2013
The writer who asserts that the union of Pakistan and Afghanistan is inevitable
General
Elections in Pakistan
are due to be held on 11 May. The election campaign is in full swing but it is
a campaign with a difference. Everything of importance to the future of Pakistan
is being completely ignored by all political parties. The top national
objective of Pakistan is the
‘liberation of Jammu and Kashmir’ and the top
security threat to Pakistan
is from the impending explosion in Afghanistan
that would follow the withdrawal of NATO from Afghanistan.
Kashmiris waving Pakistani flag in Srinagar. How long would their aspirations be
ignored?
The security situation in the area of our concern – South
Asia and the Muslim World – has come increasingly under the
direction and control of Indo-Zionists since 1967 Arab-Israeli War. The year
1967 was the watershed because Israel
demonstrated its ability to be the “unsinkable aircraft carrier” in the Eastern Mediterranean ready and willing to promote US
policies in the Arab World. Grateful USA
has helped Israel
with money and weapons to maintain its invincibility ever since. But things
have turned sour after Israel
was able to persuade the USA
to turn on its erstwhile ally – Saddam Hussain – and caused the destruction of
the state of Iraq.
Israel had no other reason
to want the USA to invade Iraq
except that it was the only country with well trained and well equipped armed
forces in the region. Now Israel
is trying very hard that the USA
invade Iran, which is
another country that has been friendly to the USA
for decades but has since withdrawn recognition from Israel. There are many wise people
in the USA who have realised
that following Israeli diktat has caused irreversible damage to the power and
influence of the USA
in the Muslim World. But the influence of Indo-Zionists over the policy making
apparatus of the USA is
still considerable and no one can be sure if Iran
or Syria may be invaded by
the USA.
Pakistan’s major concern that it
shares with the USA is over Afghanistan where India
has been driving the US
policy. India has been
helped by the US
portrayal of the problem as “terrorism”. India
has also been helped by the age old Afghan line founded on non-recognition of
the Durand Line as border between Afghanistan
and Pakistan.
Ever since its creation in 1947 when Afghanistan
was the only country not to support the admission of Pakistan
to the UN, Pakistan has been
faced with insecure borders in the East and the North West
– India and Afghanistan.
Pakistan’s security problem
increased as erstwhile USSR
became an ally of India and Afghanistan.
Encouraged by Soviet support India
went back on its promise to hold a plebiscite to allow the people of Jammu and Kashmir to decide whether to join India or Pakistan. Pakistan aligned itself with the USA but the US proved to be an unreliable
friend in 1965 as well as 1971 Wars. The entry of Soviet forces into Afghanistan in 1979 really alarmed Pakistan.
It was thought that isolation in 1971 War had encouraged the Soviet
Union to intervene. It took Pakistan
nearly two years before the USA
was persuaded to help Afghan resistance. The USA
helped with money, weapons and diplomatic support: Pakistan
provided intelligence, volunteers and training and above all a conduit for
international help to Jihad in Afghanistan.
The rest is history.
In 1985,
the Soviet Union expressed readiness to withdraw from Afghanistan. Pakistan was in the driving because
the victorious Mujhideen had no other state as overt sponsor or supporter.
Negotiations were carried out under the auspices of the UN. But sharp
differences emerged between the Junejo Administration and the ISI. Prime
Minister Junejo wanted the agreement to be restricted to terms of Soviet
withdrawal only; he did not want a change in government in Kabul. The ISI was of the view that unless
the victors got a share in power in Kabul,
war would continue as civil war. Junejo administration got its way and the
Soviet puppet – Najibullah – continued in power for another two years. These
years were characterised by deadly civil war that caused more destruction in Afghanistan
than during Soviet occupation. There were several more important issues that
needed to be resolved but were ignored. The most important issue from the point
of view of the Mujahideen who had come to Afghanistan
from all over the world was: after the exit of Soviet troops, was the war in Afghanistan
still Jihad? At that time, Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, the mentor of OBL given
credit for the revival of international jihad, issued a fatwa that the Jihad
was over and ordered all the foreign fighters to go back to their countries.
Most did but the Takfiri cults who had been waging a war against the rulers in Egypt (under Aiman al Zawahiri), and Saudi Arabia
(under OBL) could not go back. They asserted that Afghanistan after “complete
liberation” i.e. imposition of Takfiri rule, would be the base from which the
entire world of Islam could be liberated (conquered) and real Khilafa
established. The Afghan Mujahideen were ecstatic at the prospects of being the
base for the ‘true liberation’ of the Muslim World. Besides, there are aspects
of Afghan culture that facilitated Takfiri infiltration of the Afghan society.
It is
quite possible that the next government of Pakistan might repeat the mistakes
made by Junejo Administration. Once again it is difficult to pin point who are
the victors in the war in Afghanistan.
Even if that was possible it is hard to get them together and even harder to
get them to agree. A single comprehensive agreement is neither possible and I
would say it is not even desirable. There are three broad areas requiring
international agreement:
1.
Agreement to facilitate withdrawal of occupation troops. This would be a
technical agreement negotiated under UN auspices to set out conditions for
withdrawal and outline arrangements, responsibilities and time table for
withdrawal.
2. An agreement between all fighting factions to formally end Jihad including
factions based in Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. This should be
accompanied by an agreement to form an interim government, hold elections, and
draft a constitution etc. This event may be hosted by one of the Central Asian
Republics and sponsored by all the
immediate neighbours of Afghanistan.
3. An agreement between donor countries and Afghanistan to provide financial
help and security assistance for a period of ten years. (American desire to
station troops in Afghanistan
would fall into this category. This would be the last agreement to be signed;
an effort to make it the first could lead to complete failure).
Pakistan is one country whose security
concerns have to be kept in view in order to make stable peace in Afghanistan
possible. Pakistan
would have be a party in all the agreements as guarantor or conduit or both.
There is a temptation in many Western capitals to portray Pakistan as a part of
the problem – as a failed state, which is the epicentre of terrorism driven by
imperial objectives in Afghanistan and Jammu & Kashmir, riven by sectarian
strife. Diplomacy in such an environment is no easy task particularly when the
Indo-Zionists in the Pakistani media are following the same line. With Imran
Khan in the lead in the political class, who has nothing to say about Afghanistan
except to ‘get out of this war’, the fear of repetition of Junejo era nightmare
is quite real. The political class is equally vague and reticent over Kashmir. What they do not realise is that when the
political class fails to lead in articulation of challenges or responses,
others do. When the 1985 Geneva Accord on Afghanistan did not provide a
political settlement, a civil war became inevitable. When the aspiration for
peace could not be provided by war lords, the people gave victory to the
Taliban who came with Koran in one hand and Kalashnikov in the other. When the
Taliban were sidelined by the Takfiri cult, a sectarian war was superimposed on
an ethnic mosaic with no one providing a basis for national unity and cohesion.
The question is whether the political and religious matters going to be settled
by the gun or by international agreements. My suggestion is that occupying
powers lead the first and the third agreements and offer help and advice on the
second agreement only when asked.
Let us get
back to Pakistan
based Pashtun factions. A large number is still focussed on defeating the
occupation forces. By now they realise that the occupation forces are ready to
leave Afghanistan.
The question they face is how to deal with their exit. They fear the return of
a civil war which will be very unpopular with the populace sick and tired of
war. They had hoped to establish a safe haven in Pakistan. That led them into a war
with the Pakistan Army, their former mentors and protectors. They saw their
chance in Pakistan when they
found how much India and the
CIA had been involved in creating and sustaining an insurgency in Pakistan.
They noted that the political parties they were sympathetic to, are too afraid
to call the ruling coalition of the Zardari led PPP, MQM and ANP to be Indian
puppets. They decided to fight the PPP, MQM and ANP and prevent them from
winning another electoral victory by fraud and intimidation. Is there an
understanding between the parties they do not target and the Taliban? No. That
is not the method of the Taliban. But they have learnt from their experience.
They spell out their objective and let the guns do the talking. Liberation of
Jammu & Kashmir and union of Pakistan
and Afghanistan is not the
‘imperial objective’ of Pakistan
as India
would have us believe. But it is the objective of the Taliban. The defeat of
Indian puppets in 2013 elections would set the course; but it is not the final
objective. But if the victors in elections do not pay attention to the guns
that defeated the BLA and other armed bands in Karachi and Balochistan, they will be
sidelined as well. That is why I say that the price to pay for ignoring the
aspirations of the people of Afghanistan
and of Jammu and Kashmir
would be very high. ++
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