Are India's Nuclear Weapons Safe? Multiple Insurgencies and Rampant Terrorism in India
by Mike Bax, Ph.D.
Defence and Security Analyst, Pakistan Think Tank Organization
While the western governments, agencies and press focuses on Pakistan's Nuclear Program, which is under the iron clad control of Pakistan's Armed Forces and Nuclear Commad Authority.What has been below the radar of International Community is the safety and vulnerability of Indian Nuclear Weapons. First of all India's nuclear weapons are under a diffuse control of civilian and military authority. The Indian nuclear command authority has never been defined until very late in the program. Pakistan has safety systems set-up around its nuclear weapons. These systems were provided by the United States to Pakistan and to no other country. These systems are similar to those implemented in the U.S. Nuclear Command and Control Systems. In India, no such nuclear weapons safety systems exists. Even, India's civilian nuclear reactors have no such safeguards. If the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal would have been successful; Indian nuclear weapons could have been protected by fail-safe systems, which are currently deployed in the U.S. and Pakistani nuclear programs. This has also created a situation which puts India's nuclear weapons at risk of being hijacked by any one of the hosts of insurgent groups scatterred all over India. To illustrate this point, we give an analysis of rampant insurgencies and terrorism related incidents in India described in a position paper by an Indian Think Tank, South Asia Terrorism Portal 2007.
Assessment of India Insurgencies and Terrorists Organization by an Indian Think Tank, South Asia Terrorism Portal 2007
In India 2,765 people died in terrorism-related violence in India during year 2006. A review of the data indicates that nearly 41 per cent of all such fatalities occurred in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) alone as a result of the Pakistan-backed separatist proxy war in that State. 27 per cent resulted from Left Wing Extremism (Maoism/Naxalism) across parts of 14 States, prominently including Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Jharkhand, Bihar and Karnataka. 23 per cent of the total fatalities in 2006 occurred in the multiple insurgencies of India 's Northeast.
By comparison, year 2005 witnessed a total of 3,236 fatalities in terrorism-related incidents across the country. The fatality index, consequently, registered a definite decrease in year 2006.
At least 231 of the country's 608 Districts are currently afflicted, at differing intensities, by various insurgent and terrorist movements. Terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir (affecting 12 of the States 14 Districts), in different States of the Northeast (54 Districts) and Left Wing extremism (affecting at least 165 Districts in 14 States, estimate based on end-2005 data) continue to pose serious challenges to the country's security framework. In addition, wide areas of the country appear to have "˜fallen off the map' of good governance, and are acutely susceptible to violent political mobilization, lawlessness and organized criminal activity.
Jammu and Kashmir
Since 2002, terrorism-related fatalities have demonstrated a secular decline in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), and this trend continued in 2006, with a total of 1,116 persons killed. More than 40,000 people have lost their lives in the conflict since 1989, and, even at present, an average of nearly 100 lives is lost each month in J&K.
Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Jammu and Kashmir
|
Civilians
|
Security Force Personnel
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
2001
|
1067
|
590
|
2850
|
4507
|
2002
|
839
|
469
|
1714
|
3022
|
2003
|
658
|
338
|
1546
|
2542
|
2004
|
534
|
325
|
951
|
1810
|
2005
|
520
|
216
|
996
|
1732
|
2006
|
349
|
168
|
599
|
1116
|
Source: Institute for Conflict Management database. (Note: Compiled from news reports and is provisional)
The Northeast
There has been a marginal improvement in the levels of militancy in the Northeast. While 715 people died in 2005, 627 people were killed in militancy-related violence during 2006.
Nevertheless, certain States of the region have shown remarkable signs of recovery in recent years. Tripura, once considered to be one of the most violent States of the country, recorded 59 insurgency-related fatalities in 2006, down from 75 in 2005, and from a peak of 514 in 2000. Tripura is "carving out a success story in the troubled setting of India's Northeast, as its Police force reorganizes radically to evolve a counter-insurgency strategy that has left entrenched militant groups in disarray." Building on a "model of a police-led response to terrorism, which saw the country's most dramatic victory over this modern scourge in Punjab in the early 1990s, Tripura's Police, under the leadership of its Chief, G.M. Srivastava, has reversed the trajectory of insurgent violence and, crucially, mobilisation"¦ despite continued and vigorous support provided to the insurgent groups by Bangladesh, and the safe haven each of these outfits has been provided in that country."
The gains in Tripura are more than offset by the losses in Manipur, which, at 280 fatalities, now accounts for nearly 45 per cent of the fatalities in the Northeast "“ with just 5.6 per cent of the region's population. Manipur thus remains the most violent State in the region, although there is a relative decline in violence, with total fatalities registering a decline from 331 in 2005. While a number of other States in the Northeast have or are being reclaimed from protracted insurgencies, Manipur continues to remain volatile. Large-scale extortion and its impact on ordinary lives, as well as on the lives of people at the helm of affairs in the State, are symptomatic of the virtual collapse of governance in the State.
Assam too remains a disturbed State with 174 deaths in 2006 compared to 242 fatalities in 2005.
Assam, which attracts far greater national attention and accounts for 69 per cent of the population of the Northeast, saw 174 fatalities in 2006, as against 242 in 2005. The militancy in Assam persists despite continuous and successful operations by the Security Forces, with the principal terrorist groups "“ particularly the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) "“ finding permanent safe haven and significant state support across the border in Bangladesh .
Nagaland, where a "˜peace process' has been in place since 1997, saw the third largest number of fatalities in the region in 2006, with 90 dead, overwhelmingly in the fratricidal turf-war between the rival Isak-Muivah and Khaplang factions of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland. Both the militant outfits (NSCN-IM and NSCN-K) are in cease-fire agreements with the Government in Nagaland, but the Government continues been held hostage to the diktats of the insurgent groups. The process of negotiations has been complicated by insurgent groups that have appropriated the attributes of criminal and extortionist gangs, and successfully circumvent the due process of law by their engagement in the negotiation process with the Government.
The fight against insurgency in Meghalaya, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh remains largely successful.
Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in India 's Northeast, 2005-2006
States
|
2005
|
2006
|
Civilian
|
SFs
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
Civilian
|
SFs
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
Assam
|
149
|
10
|
83
|
242
|
96
|
35
|
43
|
174
|
Nagaland
|
9
|
0
|
31
|
40
|
9
|
1
|
80
|
90
|
Meghalaya
|
2
|
1
|
26
|
29
|
7
|
0
|
17
|
24
|
Manipur
|
138
|
50
|
143
|
331
|
95
|
37
|
148
|
280
|
Tripura
|
34
|
8
|
31
|
73
|
11
|
19
|
29
|
59
|
Total
|
332
|
69
|
314
|
715
|
218
|
92
|
317
|
627
|
Source: Institute for Conflict Management (Note: Compiled from news reports and is provisional)
In spite of the Government's efforts in bringing all militant outfits to the negotiating table, the region continues to remain disturbed. Indeed, "˜peace processes' that have consistently failed to get to the bottom of the core issues of the conflict, are themselves fraught with problems, producing a rush to enter into unprincipled agreements with particular, with little concern regarding the broader outcome on other groups, and on the region at large. The prevailing orientation to "˜peace processes' and negotiations with terrorist groups have often "paralyzed the state and have even occasionally undermined the will of elements within the Security Forces to act with determination against terrorism. They have certainly undermined the capacity of the political and administrative leadership to define coherent policies against terrorism, and to implement these consistently. "
In spite of the Government's efforts in bringing all militant outfits to the negotiating table, the region continues to remain disturbed. Indeed, "˜peace processes' that have consistently failed to get to the bottom of the core issues of the conflict, are themselves fraught with problems, producing a rush to enter into unprincipled agreements with particular, with little concern regarding the broader outcome on other groups, and on the region at large. The prevailing orientation to "˜peace processes' and negotiations with terrorist groups have often "paralyzed the state and have even occasionally undermined the will of elements within the Security Forces to act with determination against terrorism. They have certainly undermined the capacity of the political and administrative leadership to define coherent policies against terrorism, and to implement these consistently. "
The militant groups operating in various States of the Northeast have usually found refuge in neighbouring countries like Bangladesh and Myanmar . Fencing along the 4,096.7 kilometre-long border with Bangladesh , suggested as a remedy to the problem of militancy, has not been completed, leaving ample scope for easy entry and exit by the militants. Similarly, a number of militant groups operating in Assam , Nagaland and Manipur have taken shelter in Myanmar .
Left-Wing Extremism
Accounting for 27 per cent of the total fatalities in India during 2006, Left Wing extremism constitutes what Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh rightly described as the "single biggest internal security challenge" confronting the country. The Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) , today, exercises dominance over a large swathe of the country's territory, carry out attacks on security forces and symbols of governance at will. Chhattisgarh has now emerged as one of the principal centres of a co-ordinated Maoist movement. Indeed, with 361 fatalities in 2006, Chhattisgarh is the most violent State after Jammu and Kashmir . While the number of Maoist-affected States in the country is currently pegged at 14, the movement has demonstrated the intent and potential to spread across the length and breadth of the country. The Maoist threat has now overtaken all other insurgencies in the country "“ at least from the perspective of geographical spread, with various levels of Maoist mobilisation and violence currently afflicting at least 165 Districts in 14 States. Over the past years, moreover, while fatalities in various other insurgencies have tended to decline consistently, fatalities related to the Maoist conflict have continuously augmented.
A total of 742 persons died in Maoist-related violence across the country in 2006, up from 717 in 2005. Chhattisgarh in 2006 emerged as the worst affected State "“ dramatically displacing Andhra Pradesh "“ and the Dantewada District was by far the worst off within the State.
Fatalities in Maoist Violence, 2005-2006
States
|
2005
|
2006
|
Civilian
|
SF
|
Maoist
|
Total
|
Civilian
|
SF
|
Maoist
|
Total
|
Andhra Pradesh
|
132
|
21
|
167
|
320
|
18
|
7
|
127
|
152
|
Bihar
|
25
|
29
|
52
|
106
|
16
|
5
|
19
|
40
|
Jharkhand
|
49
|
27
|
20
|
96
|
18
|
47
|
29
|
94
|
Karnataka
|
52
|
48
|
26
|
126
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
Chhattisgarh
|
13
|
1
|
3
|
17
|
189
|
55
|
117
|
361
|
Maharashtra
|
2
|
17
|
8
|
27
|
13
|
3
|
33
|
49
|
Orissa
|
2
|
6
|
4
|
12
|
3
|
4
|
16
|
23
|
West Bengal
|
1
|
0
|
6
|
7
|
9
|
7
|
4
|
20
|
Uttar Pradesh
|
5
|
1
|
0
|
6
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
2
|
Total*
|
281
|
150
|
286
|
717
|
266
|
128
|
348
|
742
|
Source: Institute for Conflict Management database (Note: Compiled from news reports and is provisional)
According to the Union Home Ministry's Status Paper on Internal Security, the marginal increase in casualties of civilians is mainly due to high violence levels in Chhattisgarh and to some extent in Jharkhand. The paper noted that, "Chhattisgarh alone accounts for 49.30 per cent of total incidents and 59.80 per cent of total casualties in the current year." There is, however, no assessment of the reasons for the decline in violence in other States "“ other than Andhra Pradesh, where focused Police action has resulted in a flight of the Maoists "“ and there is reason to believe that the decline in violence is a Maoist decision, rather than any significant gain on the part of the state Forces. Maoist efforts are evidently and increasingly focused on political mobilization and consolidation over wider areas.
According to the Union Home Ministry's Status Paper on Internal Security, the marginal increase in casualties of civilians is mainly due to high violence levels in Chhattisgarh and to some extent in Jharkhand. The paper noted that, "Chhattisgarh alone accounts for 49.30 per cent of total incidents and 59.80 per cent of total casualties in the current year." There is, however, no assessment of the reasons for the decline in violence in other States "“ other than Andhra Pradesh, where focused Police action has resulted in a flight of the Maoists "“ and there is reason to believe that the decline in violence is a Maoist decision, rather than any significant gain on the part of the state Forces. Maoist efforts are evidently and increasingly focused on political mobilization and consolidation over wider areas.
It is useful to recognize, within this context, that the threat of the Maoists is "not limited to the areas of immediate violence, nor does this threat vanish if violence is not manifested at a particular location for a specific period of time. It is in the complex processes of political activity, mass mobilisation, arms training and military consolidation that the Maoist potential has to be estimated." Significantly, the CPI-Maoist has established "Regional Bureaus across a mass of nearly two-thirds of the country's territory, and these regions are further sub-divided into state, special zonal and special area committee jurisdictions, where the processes of mobilisation have been defined and allocated to local leaders. This structure of organisation substantially reflects current Maoist plans, but does not exhaust their perspectives or ambitions. There is further evidence of preliminary activity for the extension of operations to new areas including Gujarat , Rajasthan, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir and Meghalaya, beyond what is reflected in the scope of the regional, zonal and state committees." Maoists have also articulated a new strategy to target urban centres in their "Urban Perspective Document", drawing up guidelines for "working in towns and cities", and for the revival of a mobilization effort targeting students and the urban unemployed. Two principal 'industrial belts' have been identified as targets for urban mobilisation: Bhilai-Ranchi- Dhanbad-Calcutta and Mumbai-Pune- Surat-Ahmedabad. Union Home Minister Shivraj Patil told the Lok Sabha (Lower House of Parliament) on December 5, 2006, that Maoists were now planning to target important installations in major cities of India . Patil said "Like forests provide safe hideouts to Naxalites in tribal areas, the cities also provide them cover. Taking advantage of this, they plan to target major installations in cities."
The Maoist menace continues to expand, except where it has been confronted by coherent use of force "“ as is presently and substantially the case in Andhra Pradesh, where area domination exercise under the leadership of the local Police, backed by the armed reserve forces and the Grey Hounds, and a well-developed intelligence network, have succeeded in beating back the Naxalites to a large extent, and have forced their leadership into flight. The Andhra Pradesh Police has long prepared for this confrontation and has consistently developed its capacities to engage with the Maoists in their "˜strongholds', though it has been repeatedly inhibited by political constraints from effective action. These constraints appear, for the moment, to have been lifted.
Other States, however, remain far from prepared. Indeed, a consistent feature across all the major Maoist-affected States is that they have extraordinarily poor policing capacities. As against a national average of 122 police personnel per 100,000 population, and some peaceful States with ratios as high as 854/100,000 (Mizoram) and 609/100,000 (Sikkim), Bihar has just 57, Jharkhand "“ 85, Chhattisgarh "“ 103 and Orissa "“ 90, and even Andhra Pradesh, just 98 per 100,000 population. Worse, there is ample evidence that large proportions of the Central allocation for police modernisation and up-gradation remain unspent or are being diverted or mis-spent. Utilization of funds has been particularly poor over the years in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar , Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand.
Islamist Terrorism outside J&K and the Northeast
At least 270 people died in Islamist terrorist violence in locations outside J&K and the Northeast during 2006. The significant incidents included:
March 7: At least 21 civilians were killed and 62 others injured in three serial bomb explosions at a temple and railway station in Varanasi . Seven bombs were later defused, including four that had been planted on the
April 14: Two bombs exploded inside the Jama Masjid at Delhi injuring approximately 14 persons, including a woman and a girl.
June 1: Three suspected LeT terrorists were shot dead during an abortive attempt to storm the headquarters of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, a right-wing Hindu organization, at Nagpur in Maharashtra .
July 11: At least 200 persons were killed and over 700 others injured in seven bomb blasts targeting the railway network in the city of Mumbai . First class compartments of local trains at Mira-Bayandhar, Jogeshwari, Mahim, Santacruz, Khar, Matunga and Borivli stations on the Western Railway were targeted.
September 8: Forty people killed and 65 sustain injuries in three bomb explosions at Malegaon town in the Nashik District of Maharashtra.
Worse, terrorist attacks have occurred in places as far as Delhi , Mumbai, Malegaon , and Varanasi in 2006. Terrorist attacks in places like Mumbai and Varanasi in 2006 and earlier at Bangalore (December 28, 2005) and New Delhi (October 29, 2005).
The Existence of homegrown Terrorist Organizations in India
The US based Terrorism Research Center, the US Think Tank on this issue, has gone on to label RSS, the patriarch of Hindutva organizations, BJP, VHP, Bajarang dal, Shiv Sena, Sangh parivar, etc., as a terrorist outfit. RSS shares this category with other organizations defamed in different parts of the World as terrorists like Al Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, Hamas etc. Sangh's (RSS progeny) own definition and understanding of terrorists has been summed up by RSS pracharak (propagator) and current Gujarat Chief Minister, Narendra Modi in the sentence, "All Muslims are not terrorists, but all terrorists are Muslims!" How come a Muslim baiter organization itself has been so labeled! Modi was disbarred from entering the United States due to his affiliation and defense of Hindutva terrorist groups., which killed over 5000 people, mostly Muslims in one fell swoop in the Indian State of Gujrat. These Hindu terrorists are as doctrinaire as Taliban; and are labeled as Hindu Taliban. They have support centers in the U.S., particularly in the Silicon Valley and in the United Kingdom. Hindutva philosophy of violence against Muslims is pervasive in the rank and file of Indian Army. How is it that the U.S. and Western Powers not paid attention to this phenomena. In a catalysmic scenario, an Indian outfit like Shiv Sena, can get hold of a nuclear weapon and start an accidental war with Pakistan. Has the Pentagon planners looked into such a very real possibility; considering how pervasive Hindutva ideology is among Indian Armed forces.
Conclusion: The Ticking Time Bomb of the Vulnerability of Indian Nuclear Weapons
The global community has to look into the safety of India's Nuclear Weapons in the light of the multiple security threats in India. Indian Armed Forces have members, who belong to ethnic minorities, who are fighting these wars of liberation. It stands to reason that any one of them can act as a catalyst in helping an extremist group acquire such lethal capability. How long is the West, particularly, the United States ignore the vulnerability of Indian Nuclear weapons? Democracy does not provide safeguards around nuclear triggers! How long will U.S. Peace Organizations and Think Tanks like Carnegie Endowment for Peace, Council on Foreign Relations, Brookings Institution, Stimson Center, and the Pentagon and the CIA ignore this ticking time bomb? Or will the focus be on the transparent, well safe guarded and NCA controlled Nuclear program of Pakistan? The issue of the safety of Indian Nuclear Program is a ticking time-bomb, which the world cannot afford to ignore. Does the United States have contingency programs for Indian and Israeli nuclear weapons; both these nations reside in a sea of violence and instability.
Gowdolia-Dasashwame dh Ghat Roadnear the Kashi Vishwanath Temple . Hours after the blasts, a suspected LeT terrorist was shot dead during an encounter with the police in the Gosaiganj area on the outskirts of Lucknow city
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