Are we going back to the politics of 1990s? 

By

 Dr. Ghayur Ayub

These days, senior analysts are predicting the return of confrontational politics as seen in the 1990s and that the conciliatory steps taken in CoD by the late Benazir Bhutto and Mr. Nawaz Sharif will soon be reversed. They say the swords are out pointing at the opponent's jugular. Before accepting such a scenario, let's go back to 2004 as that year was the turning point in the history of political understanding between the opponents. Up until that year, the American blue-eyed Musharaf, like Attila the Hun wearing various caps of power, had conquered Pakistan. With the strong support of the American leadership, he, with his usual smile of confidence, used to challenge the exiled leaders of the two major parties to try and enter Pakistan. It was the shrewd late Benazir Bhutto who realised that upfront confrontational politics among politicians had to change before she could make a breakthrough with the powerful lobbyists in America. According to media reports, confirmed by her close colleagues, BB repeatedly tried to create links with the mighty and powerful in Washington but failed.  

It was then, when she along with her husband Asif Zardari called on Mr. Nawaz Sharif at Saroosh Palace in Jeddah. And it was there that an understanding developed between the two leaders, which led to the initiation of the Charter of Democracy. Ishaq Dar and Ehsan Iqbal from PML-N and Amin Fahim and Raza Rabbani from PPP were given the task of making it a reality. As the drafting progressed, the number in the team from both sides increased. The final document was signed on May, 14 2006, at Rehman Malik's residence behind Edgware Road in London. According to reports received in the International Secretariat of PML-N on Duke Street, London, while BB was having consultations with NS, she was making inroads with relevant American quarters. As a prelude to those contacts, she also approached Musharaf courtesy of RM. Some senior members of PML-N felt uneasy with this "˜double approach', but Nawaz Sharif prevailed upon them. He wanted to work on changed politics based on conciliation and not confrontation. To avoid derailment of a new understanding, lack of trust did not distract him, despite pressure from his colleagues.

It was a few months later, when BB had a breakthrough in America. The events of March, 9, 2007 played an important role in that breakthrough. Seeing a rousing public response against Musharaf's regime, the American influential think-tanks could foresee the political demise of Musharaf. It was then, they found a replacement in the leadership of BB, who was not only leading a major political party but also her political aims were identical to Musharaf. All they needed was reconciliation between her and Musharaf, which turned out to be a piece of cake. Again, BB like a shrewd politician gave statements on AQ Khan, Taliban, Lal Massjid, Nuclear assets which sounded like pleasant bells to the Americans. Taking it further, with the help of Afrasayab, Asfandar Wali of ANP joined hands; so did MQM. During delicate negotiations behind closed doors, in which BB played an important role, the NRO took shape and the rest is history. It won't be out of place to presume that after signing the CoD, it would be out of NS's character to oppose BB in the struggle of removing Musharaf.

Why she was eliminated from the political scene at a crucial time of change in a most tragic and horrific way has created many theories. Without going into them, one thing became clear after her assassination, NS found himself facing a new leadership, who was never part of major negotiations/decisions. Initially, the negotiations started smoothly in a cordial atmosphere. The new leader of PPP-Asif A. Zardari gave the impression he was following the policies of the late BB. He strengthened his position when he passionately announced in front of the world media that he would like to extend this cordiality with NS to family levels. But the journey soon became bumpy when AAZ started retracting from his promises, leaving no space for NS on manoeuvrability. In such state of affairs, while the analysts are predicting the rebirth of old politics of confrontation, I have my reservations.   

Yes; the hawks on both sides might like to see their leadership boxed in 1990 in letter and spirit. Yes; there is a chance of political confrontation as we see things unfold. But this confrontation will be different from the one we saw in the early nineties. The question is how and why? The politics of Pakistan, hinge on two parameters; local political environment and global politico-economic conditions. Both these have changed for Pakistan since 9/11.

We all know that the internal environment took a somersault in 1999, when a democratically elected government with; 2/3 majority in National Assembly; overwhelming support in Senate with its own chairman; its own Speaker in National Assembly; its own President with minimal powers; strong support from provincial governments especially the important province of Punjab; and a supportive judiciary.  This was in the face of certainty that though the public were resentful of the tilted governance of the government; they were not willing to come out on the streets to topple it. In a nutshell, the government was extremely "˜safe and strong'. Then why was such a "˜safe and strong' government shown the door? Because, it was according to the internal political environment as it existed before the attacks of 9/11. Those attacks changed global politics and that change affected the politics of Pakistan. The "˜strategic depth' politics vis-à-vis Afghanistan of the 1980s which was the dream of late Gen. Zia and was ironically implemented by BB in the mid 1990s had no place after 9/11. No more pro-Taliban politics.

The Americans were back with full force expecting us to fight "˜Muslim fundamentalists' in a "˜war on terror' as coalition partners. Fighting against "˜Kafir' was easy, but fighting against Muslims was difficult. In light of such a scenario, Gen Musharaf cleverly brought MMA of six religious parties in power in two provinces bordering Afghanistan through the "˜doctored elections' of 2002. I call it "˜doctored elections' because it was confirmed by a senior army officer attached then to ISI. On one hand, Musharaf wanted to show the Americans that he was under pressure from the Muslim groups, on the other hand; he promised MMA to doff his uniform in two years. He killed three birds with one stone, by convincing the Americans that he was the man for the job, by cheating MMA, and by obeying Supreme Court Judgement to bring civilian government within three years. The MMA in their political naivety and power grab helped pass the 17^th Constitutional Amendment. Later, they decided to stay as "˜friendly opposition' in the centre after tasting the fruit of power for two years despite their moral obligation to quit when Musharaf decided not to doff his uniform on December, 31, 2004. Americans realised later, that he was not going to go all the way to support them in the "˜war on terror.'  On the subject of the judiciary the less said the better.

It was around 2006 when the Americans fully comprehended that Musharaf was not sincere in his "˜promises'. If it wasn't for the strong support of Dick Cheney, Pakistan might have seen the back of him as army chief earlier than 2007. Some believe that "˜hidden hands' played important role in the episode of March 9, 2007. His policy of changing public psyche by opening 36 TV channels and giving them free hand to show westernised programs also backfired. He missed an important point that the majority of the public have political mentality which flourishes on gossips. So instead of watching cultural programs, they tuned their TVs to news and political talk shows with disastrous consequences for him. When he tried to clamp the wings of the electronic media he failed as, by then, the opportunity had slipped away from his hands. It was in those days when BB made her case stronger in America. What happened as a result is history.

To summarise the situation, we find; the global political atmosphere has changed since 9/11; the print and electronic media is free; the internet and mobile phones are not under the control of the government; the "˜war on terror' has become our war; the democrats have taken over the White House and the new dynamic black president is breathing down our neck vis-à-vis Afghanistan policy; the expected enhancement in American aid for development projects; the increasing tensions on unstable east and west borders; a professional army general leading the Pak army. In such changed circumstances, it is extremely difficult for the two major political parties to go back all the way and engage in confrontational politics of 1990s. Also, the army cannot afford to come to the front as it did in 1990s and beyond. So what ever change we will see as a result of present day confrontations, it will be one in which the army will take the back seat. It will not be out of place to presume that this time the powers that be will support the judiciary, which will ride a white horse in a form and shape never seen in the history of Pakistan to the pleasant surprise of civil society and vast majority of the public. At the end of the day; it is the public sensitivity and their opinion which matter and Nawaz Sharif understands it and AAZ doesn't. The latter is following the footsteps of Musharaf and has put all his eggs in American basket. Doesn't he realise what happened to his predecessor president last year?  

The end