A widely known reality that it is the Taliban (read Neo-Viet Cong) who rule Afghanistan outside the Presidential Palace and self-preserving fortified abodes of the occupation forces, has now been reconfirmed via a NATO source which has stated, “Taliban have their shadow governors in all but one province of Afghanistan.” Yet, President Barack Obama laboured hard, at West Point, only a month ago that “Afghanistan is not another Vietnam.” In the same vein, the other high marks of his speech were commitment for a speedy and effective employment of ‘Surge II’ and also the announcement about the withdrawal timeline.

Kandahar, Zabul, Hilmand, Orazgan Nooristan & Kunar. According to an ISoC report the US faces total collapse in Afghanistan. This is a map of Talibanistan: 2009 Afghan map showing Taliban control

Right at the outset, Surge II seems to be losing steam in terms of intensity and focus. Indications are that the envisaged timeframe for the complete induction of 30,000-strong contingent is expected to drag on. And the last contingent would not be fielded before November, against the initially envisaged timeline of August. Time lag reinforces the perception that the American war potential is overstretched and is unable to take further load without resorting to draft. Another option is to recycle into Afghanistan the troops who would be withdrawn from Iraq. The later line of action appears to be the likely option. It is feared that the troops shortfall for Surge II may be made up by inducting additional air effort, especially the unmanned component; the notorious drones.

As and when Surge II is operationalised, it would double the presence of occupation boots. Almost an equal number of followers and contractors could have come as a bonus. Moreover, direct war spending has crossed the one trillion mark, the US economy is in a nosedive and additional appropriations for war effort may no longer be tenable without having a telling effect on the social sector budgeting.

Opacity continues pertaining timeframe of various activities in terms of capacity and capability enhancement programmes. A major shock generator is the news that President Obama has not agreed to double the strength of the Afghan National Army as recommended by General Stanley McChrystal. This raises serious doubts about the US commitment towards post-withdrawal stability of Afghanistan.

President Obama opted to retain all-points men of the previous administration for managing the military component of his Afghan policy and for the operational level application of military instrument. Hence, the mindset of continuity prevails at operational and tactical levels.

Due to foot-dragging by Pentagon, now the induction of Surge I&II largely resembles the patterns followed by President Lyndon Johnson in Vietnam and by President Gorbachev in Afghanistan, towards the end of their occupation. Thus, the end result of Obama’s surges is not expected to be far different.

In reality, surge employment is generally the desperate action of a field commander; whereby he tends to throw to the wind the usual cautions about minimal collateral damage, the rights of combatants and adherence to the fundamentals of international laws of war.

In case of Afghanistan, the application of contractors or dubious Blackwater category troops is likely to be the hallmark of heightened military application. Normal military rules are not applicable to these dubious mercenaries. General McChrystal’s previous experience as commander joint special operations command is likely to lure him into near criminal application of these guys. As regards accountability, America is not a signatory to the International Criminal Court. So far so safe!

It is with this background that a perception is snowballing, especially in the Western media, that the US may well be sleep walking into a Vietnam like situation. And Obama may join the club of single term presidents or of those few who abdicated the second term contest.

The Americans have clearly ended up in mission creep. This mission injudiciousness is now being widely perceived as mission malice. Deliberate uncertainty has created vagueness amongst the allies. The most hard hit is the willingness of ISAF troops contributing states; they are in no mood to continue the errand indefinitely.

Moreover, the faulty American strategy in Afghanistan has had tremendous negative fallouts in Pakistan. In fact most of Pakistan’s woes of these days are a direct and indirect outcome of American follies in Afghanistan. So after perceiving this reality the hard way, the Pakistani public has evolved almost a nationwide consensus on several cardinal aspects of this war.

Firstly, the extremists must be eliminated through composite means, of which the application of military instrument is just one aspect; and the mainstay is multi-tier, multi-faced dialogue.

Secondly, this war is not of Pakistan’s making and its blossoming within Pakistani territories is an outcome of the faulty strategy adopted by occupation forces in Afghanistan in pursuit of their overseas counterinsurgency operations.

Thirdly, as long as the occupation forces continue to encamp in Afghanistan and rely mainly on military power as a major tool to quell the insurgency there, Pakistanis’ miseries with respect to confronting the mounting terrorist activities would persist.

Fourthly, Pakistan’s owning of the global war on terror symbiotically with the Americans is neither factual nor tenable. This war is Pakistan’s war to the extent the Americans have imposed it upon Pakistan.

Fifth, all requests by Pakistan to seal off the Afghan borders with Pakistan have purposely fell on deaf ears; hence, the Americans have no right to hot pursuit.

Sixth, containing the conflict within Afghanistan is the responsibility of the occupation forces.

Seventh, the exodus of extremist elements into Pakistan is facilitated by the American application of military power.

Eighth, the Americans have a stake in the perpetual instability of Pakistan, which is seen as a stepping-stone for the ultimate target that is its nuclear assets.

Ninth, Pakistan’s responsibility ends with the return of peace to its own territory.

Tenth, Pakistan should extend all possible help to the comity of nations, as indeed to Afghanistan, towards making it a tranquil territory; for calm in Pakistan is contingent upon a peaceful Afghanistan.

Hence, a nationwide consensus for a mediation-based solution is snowballing pretty fast amongst the intelligentsia of Pakistan. A conviction is gaining strength that after the successful execution of military operations by the armed forces of Pakistan; the environment now appears ripe for launching a Track II type of process. A homegrown mediation-biased solution to the problem is being perceived as the only durable way of sustainable peace in Pakistan.

In this backdrop, the American influence and hence leverage is shrinking at a pretty fast pace. To reach a win-win finale, dialogue-based approach is their last hope in the region. Besides intra-Pakistan dialogue, Pakistan has requisite leverage to facilitate an intra-Afghan dialogue with the help of other friendly countries. Intra-Afghan dialogue can help transform the current Afghan government into a broad based political dispensation.

To accrue credibility, the withdrawal promise needs to be coupled with confidence building measures like halting the expansion of military infrastructure and withdrawal of air power from the theatre of operations, especially the drones.

As of now, Americans are most likely to gate crash into a Vietnam like finale. Post-US occupation of Afghanistan is destined to resemble its post-Soviet era model. It is indeed painful for the well-wishers of Pak-US and Pak-Afghan relations to predict this gory scenario. Out of stubbornness, the Americans are in a denial mode. Therefore, Pakistan needs to take corrective and preventive measures to avoid the inevitable fallout.

The writer is a retired air commodore, PAF.

Email: khalid3408@gmail. com