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Impatience with democracy
By S. Akbar Zaidi
A PHRASE which one hears increasingly in the media is that people are getting "˜impatient with democracy' and more critical of this elected government.
Subtle warnings about what may happen are being sent out to those who are criticising the incumbent government. This criticism is being interpreted as a criticism of democracy.
While clearly the government in power in Islamabad today and the processes and institutions of democracy are two different entities, my argument here is that there is always a need to be impatient with democracy rather than succumb to the "˜let-us-wait- and-see' approach. In fact, it is only a vigilant and critically impatient engagement with democracy which ensures that essential and urgent democratic steps are taken to ensure its longevity.
Clearly, one is not talking here of any sort of adventurism. All transitions from military government to electoral and democratic politics are brittle and require strengthening over a fair amount of time. Nevertheless, after making an objective assessment of conditions and the situation of all actors involved, one needs to point out the urgency to press on with the democratic agenda further.
One of the key questions which troubles me regarding Pakistan's democracy "” current and past "” is why it is that democrats and elected civilian representatives fail to strengthen and deepen democracy once they achieve power. In opposition, the same political parties and their leaders make many promises which would ensure that democracy be strengthened and anti-democratic forces become weakened once they come to power.
However, on all three occasions "” 1971, 1988 and 2008 "” once in power after undemocratic dispensations, elected representatives failed to carry out substantial political tasks which would have ensured the longevity of their own government and of democracy itself. Because of the lack of attention to furthering democracy's agenda, I believe that democratically elected governments should share the blame for democracy's failure and subsequent military intervention precisely because they fail to further democracy once in power.
Throughout 2007, following the lawyer's movement which started in March, Gen Musharraf's Nov 3 emergency and the Dec 27 assassination of Ms Bhutto, there was a huge momentum against the military, against the war on terror and against Gen Musharraf and his government, a sentiment which turned positive towards democracy, participation and representation.
It became quite clear that whoever would form the government after elections would have a freer hand in boosting the democratic agenda further than perhaps at any time in Pakistan's history since 1971. In nearly four decades, with so much popular support, with a weakened establishment and a retreating military, real democracy was poised to take root in Pakistan. Sadly, however, by not responding to certain necessary interventions in the political process, the Zardari-Gilani government has failed to strengthen democracy in Pakistan, and may have actually set up the grounds to weaken it.
Leading up to the elections of February 2008, people and voters had come to expect a number of key issues to be addressed. These included: the ouster of President Musharraf after his party lost the election and after Ms Bhutto's assassination and the hope that the retired general-president would be held accountable for his anti-democratic nine years; the reinstatement of the deposed Chief Justice of Pakistan, Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry; a repeal of Gen Musharraf's 17th Amendment to the Constitution particularly Article 58-2(b) which allows the president of Pakistan to dismiss an elected government; and a wish-list which hoped that a coalition between Mr Zardari's People Party and Nawaz Sharif's Muslim League could have tried to clip the military's wings and assert civilian power over what in Pakistan is called "˜the establishment' .
All that has happened from this list, is that Mr Zardari removed President Musharraf and became president himself. Musharraf was not tried nor held accountable, nor were any of the other political tasks addressed which would have significantly strengthened democracy. This has been the third occasion, following 1971 and 1988, where a democratic dispensation' s greatest failure has been its inability and unwillingness to further democracy in Pakistan. In fact, given that democratic forces were strongest and largely united against authoritarianism in 2008, far more than in 1971 and 1988, or perhaps at any other time, this must count as democracy's biggest failure.
Under such circumstances and conditions, it is perhaps criminal to be quiet and be "˜patient' with democracy. One becomes complicit in the fall of democracy and in the revival of authoritarian and military rule by not being consistently vigilant with regard to a democratic programme and transition which continues to have broad and far-reaching support. In fact, democracy is strengthened only by more democracy, not less of it. There are clear signals that the government is weakening and has lost its writ over parts of Pakistan, and that anti-democratic forces are strengthening their attacks on the elected government.
Despite this, at least for the moment, but one cannot say for how much longer, the democratic process still seems fairly secure in Pakistan, even though it has clearly weakened over the last few months. Perhaps this weakening has been on account of too much patience with democracy and not enough impatience with it.
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