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Analysis: India and Pakistan in War and Peace AHMAD KHAN
The complexities of
South Asia’s political and geostrategic environment drives scholars, experts
and practitioners from within subcontinent and the West to share their
scholarly views on the dynamics of its major component: the India-Pakistan
relationship. A relook or revisit to their scholarly work in form of book,
biographies and research papers gives us a broad canvas to draw a holistic
picture of the ever fragile relationship since the subcontinent partition in
1947. Most of the scholarly work is about studying the dynamics of relationship
that have been changing since the Cold War. Such books and research papers
discussed the nature of the conflict and the security competition between India
and Pakistan as per the understandings of the authors. J.N. Dixit articulated
the nature, history and type of relationship between the two archrivals in the
subcontinent, in his biographic cum academic style work, India and Pakistan
in War Peace (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 494. The late
Khushwant Singh, who studied Indo-Pak relationship dispassionately, lauded Dixit’s
systemic study, saying “he knows what he is writing about. He is objective,
clear-headed and lucid. He knows his facts and marshalls them with ability.”
Singh’s front page endorsement makes Dixit’s work a must-read for those who
love to study masala on Indo-Pak relationship. J.N. Dixit was the Indian
High Commissioner to Pakistan from 1989 to 1991. He also served as Indian
foreign secretary from 1991-1994. His last assignment was the National Security
Advisor to the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh for a year until his death
in 2005.
The main theme of the book is his attempt to explore “the deeper
the fault-lines in Pakistani society, the more adversarial became Pakistan’s
attitude and policies towards India.” (p7.) The author’s contention about the
adversarial relationship in the subcontinent has put Pakistan in the driving
seat. The study remained focus on the actions taken by Pakistan to settle
territorial disputes with its strategic competitor—India, since its inception.
The study has encompassed the history of Indo-Pak relationship, since the
“shameful flight” of British Raj from the subcontinent in 1947. Dixit is
pretty much convinced in his writing that after the divide, troubles in
Pakistan have strongly impinged upon the relationship towards India. The author
has determinedly written that most of the Congress leadership wasn’t in favor
of the partition. In fact, the literature survey on Indo-Pak history does
suggest the same kind of findings. However, little has been discussed on the Muslim
League point of view of having a separate homeland for the Muslims of
subcontinent, or for their attempts to have a loose federation with their
support of the 1946 Cabinet Mission Plan.
In the beginning of the book, the author tells his meeting with
Cowasji Jehangir. The author gives compliments to Jehangir for providing a
“post facto rationale” for the book. He quotes Jehangir stating that the
objective of the partition of subcontinent was fruitless and unable to meet its
desire goals. The writer underpinned his book of being one of the critiques of
the Partition. Likewise, he also argued that Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Jawaharlal
Nehru wanted to end the “antagonism, apprehension, and suspicion” towards each
other. However, according to the main theme of the book; which suggests
Pakistan being the driving force behind the changing dynamics of the
relationship; exactly the opposite has occurred as inspired by Jinnah and Nehru
at the time of partition. Dixit stressed that the subcontinent remained vulnerable,
hostile, fragile, and volatile than ever before. The Indo-Pak mistrust and
rivalry created more hostility and belligerency in the region. The writer, who
has enjoyed top position at highest rung of decision-making body in India for
several years, pinned down his first-hand knowledge regarding some of the
decisions taken by Indian leadership at the time of numerous crises. In fact,
the book which is all about Indo-Pak relationship in peace and war, accounted
all three wars fought in the region, as well as the Kargil conflict.
The whole study pivots around criticizing and demonizing Pakistan
as the source of troubles in the region, and hence the spoiler of peace. The
main theme of the writer seemingly organized the whole study to discuss the
internal politics of the Pakistan as a spillover effect on its brittle
relationship with India. The writer discuss the internal politics of Pakistan
in two chapters “the break-up of Pakistan: Mujibnagar to Simla—the Advent of
Zia-ul-Haq” and “Coup to Coup: Pakistan 1972-1999.” The chapters are written
under the umbrella of his hypothetical statement labeling Pakistan for creating
friction with India. Similarly, the author also discussed about the
nuclearization of South Asia. He explicitly discussed the post-1998 situation
in a very cognitive manner. In the middle of the book the writer discussed the
strategic culture of the two regional rivals. However, as his hypothesis
focuses on Pakistan, he remained biased towards its role. He discussed the role
of Pakistan in Agra Summit and other negotiation processes. Interesting, the
writer is pretty much convinced that it was military which didn’t accept the
1999 Lahore Declaration wholeheartedly. Likewise, the writer also blamed former
President General Pervaiz Musharaff behind the fruitless 2001 Agra Summit. At
the end of the study, J.N. Dixit stressed that the 9/11 terrorist attacks
brought a complete transformation in the international security environment,
and significantly impacted on the entire matrix of the Indo-Pakistan relationship.
He opined 9/11 also impinged upon Musharraf’s decision to end the
“three-and-a-half decades of incremental Islamisation of Pakistani civil
society and Pakistan’s power structure resulted in this mindset.” (p412.) In
last chapter, the author suggests that “India faces a complex predicament in
dealing with Pakistan.” (p430.) In fact, study seems to end on this particular
statement of his that “there is no clear shift in Pakistan’s India policies,”
as he was criticizing Musharraf for still harboring terrorist groups in the
country to fight a proxy war with India in the disputed territory of Jammu and
Kashmir.
Analysis: It is always interesting to read an Indian perspective
on the Indo-Pak relationship and J.N. Dixit’s analysis, accounts and knowledge
on this particular relationship are noteworthy. However, every writer while
articulating its narrative or knowledge on the issue, always comes with some
certain preferences and biases. The book is relevant to study the period of war
and peace between India and Pakistan before the 21st century.
Interestingly, the book covers the major part of Indo-Pak history. The author
main theme was about societal fault-lines in Pakistan having a spillover effect
on Indo-Pak relations. There are societal fault-lines in India too. Hindu
extremist party always threaten Pakistan which are strongly intercepted in
Pakistani society, In fact, the occupation of Jammu and Kashmir by the Indian
forces draw strong sentimental and emotions with the Pakistani society towards
Kashmiris.
Unfortunately, Pakistan fault-lines get too much attention in the
book while ignoring some profound historical factors. It is interesting to
mention that the author completely neglected the economic and military
condition of Pakistan right after independence. Dixit neglected to mention
Indian leadership’s dismissive views towards Pakistan’s sovereignty and
survival, as well as lingering of Kashmir dispute, setting the stage for a
bitter rivalry. The author completely wiped-off Indian involvement in creating Mukti-Bahini
(first ever non-state entity in South Asia) in East Pakistan during late 1960s
raising tensions with Islamabad. Also, the author downplayed the Indian promise
of giving Kashmiris for vote to exercise their right of self-determination per
UNSC Resolutions. These are some of the issues that should have been embedded
with rest of the arguments in the book. The book was more anecdotal in its
content due to a significant lack of academic references. The book is more like
a biographic cum research book based on personal experiences of the author and
more or less gives a summary of the Indian political elite’s perceptions and
apprehensions towards Pakistan. J.N. Dixit’s diplomatic background and
positions meant that whatever he wrote would have to be steadfast to the
official line when writing this book.
Nonetheless, it is a worthy read to understand the Indian
diplomatic corps stratagem on dealing with Pakistan and their role in the
decision-making processes for the political government in New Delhi.
AHMAD KHAN
P.hd. Scholar
Strategic
and Nuclear Studies Department
National
Defence University, Islamabad
Blog: www.ahmadsvi.wordpress.com
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