Dear Senator Obama,

Re: US Policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan 

            You have just returned from a tour of the Middle East and Afghanistan where you reiterated your commitment to withdrawing US troops from Iraq by the end of 2010 but advocated that US troops in Afghanistan be reinforced. 

I am from Pakistan; there is disquiet in that country over your resolve to reinforce failure in Afghanistan. There is also fear in Pakistan that their country might fall apart just like Afghanistan. However, Pakistan would not be the first country where the US would end up hurting its friends more than its enemies. President Saddam Hussain was the friend of the USA when he invaded Iran. Then the USA turned on Iraq to destroy it in the First Gulf War; Saddam was removed and executed in the wake of the Second Gulf War; now Iraq is being readied for use as a base for invading Iran. It is feared it is the intent of the US to replicate Iraq in Pakistan; it is hard to read the threats being made any other way.

I am not sure if the USA sees its intervention and occupation of Iraq as a success. Oil has quadrupled in price; the reputation and credibility of the US has never been lower; the world economy is in turmoil; and Israel is less secure. That is bad; but every facet is reversible. The oil price always depended on Saudi Arabia and the USA working together and it still does. The reputation and credibility of the US policy would be restored in the Larger Middle East if US military withdrew from Iraq and Afghanistan and a principled stand was taken on Palestine, Kashmir and other peoples struggling for self-determination. The precedent of history gives hope. The US withdrawal from Viet Nam did have a short-lived domino effect in South East Asia but its longer-term effect was Soviet intervention in Afghanistan that led to the end of Communism in Europe. It is often ignored that the Muslim World was on side not just against Soviet occupation of Afghanistan but also during the Second World War and the Cold War.

Sometimes the biggest victories are won in the wake of defeat and/or withdrawal; Viet Nam is certainly its prime example. Withdrawal from Iraq could have the same effect. In Iraq, if the objective was OIL "“ Oil, Israel and Logistics - it is now apparent that an exit from Iraq would lower price of oil and improve access to local logistics. But Israel is less secure and it wants the USA to remain entangled in the Middle East. The "˜strategists', who got the US to invade Iraq, are now pressing for reinforcement of US troops Afghanistan. It is already a logistic nightmare to support the troops even at existing level. Surely the intent (or unintended consequence) of reinforcement would be that the Afghan War would be fought over the territory of Pakistan.

India is excited at the prospect. The instability and destruction resulting from the war expanding into Pakistan, India perceives, would help its quest for hegemony in the region. The new line of the neo-con is that India is bigger, more powerful, and more resolute than the other US allies in the region. Therefore, the substitution of the USA by India is a 'isk free' and "˜cost free' strategy for the triumph of the USA in South and Central Asia. But there is a downside. The defeat and destruction of regular armed forces is an essential pre-requisite for the "˜non-state resistance' to fill the vacuum. The armed forces of Iraq and Afghanistan were destroyed by the USA; Palestine and Jammu & Kashmir did not have any; non-state resistance filled the vacuum. They have since evolved the tactics and strategy for a "˜longer war' than what the occupiers are prepared for. However, two facts are important:

• Political Islam had been seen as a menace by a majority of Muslims and was unable to gain substantive support in Muslim communities until Muslim majority territories came under prolonged occupation.
• Political Islam is nothing new. Its ability to crystallise popular objectives at a time when the state is unable or unwilling to identify and pursue those objectives is the secret of its power.

What the Americans choose to call "˜terrorism' is "˜popular resistance' in the eyes of those on whose behalf it is carried out. In Afghanistan, the further problem is that the US objectives are unclear and the resolve of the Afghans to resist is almost indefinite. The lack of clarity does not concern the Afghans that much; foreign presence is motivation enough. But it is crucially important to Pakistan. It is widely believed that the US wants the break up of Pakistan; the insistence of the US to bomb targets in Pakistan resulting in massive civilian casualties is seen as evidence of the US mal-intent. The public in Pakistan is so hostile and afraid that even a statement in support of the US "˜War on Terror' is enough to draw the wrath of the people. That is why, in less than four months after its inauguration, the approval rating of the Zardari Administration of Pakistan is less than 20%.

Non-state resistance cannot be defeated by occupiers; it is the response to occupation. Political Islam ceases to be a force in a state with a legitimate popular government. It has been counter-productive for the USA to be ambivalent in Pakistan; it should have supported the impeachment of Musharraf and restoration of the judges removed by him. The ineptitude and inaction of the present government can easily lead to Pakistan becoming a "˜failed state'. That might be seen as an "˜opportunity' by India to instigate rebellion and strife. But Pakistan can much more easily return to democracy, and to rule of law, just by removing Musharraf, restoring the judges, and sending back into exile the corrupt wheelers and dealers who are now in control. This can be done in a matter of weeks. Such a Pakistan would help bring peace to Afghanistan that its war weary people desperately need and deserve.