US wants no nuclear accord with Pakistan -DAWN - Top Stories; November 19, 2006It's based upon the same premise as the 1969 "super-secret accord" by Richard M. Nixon with Golda Meier about Israels nuclear pursuits and the role of Dimona nuclear reactor in Negev Desert (proclaimed as a Textile factory by Ben Gurion, but proven wrong by U-2 Surveillance photographs (supported by Vanunu revelation by photographs, printed by Sunday Times on October 5, 1986) under the urging of Henry Kissinger , aka "Don't Ask, Don't Test," classified as Top Secret, but known only to very few officials like Defense Secretary Melvin Laird and his Deputy, David Packard.
Source: Letter to Editor, (page 8) The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Nov/Dec 2006, by Gerald M. Steinberg (Director, Program on Conflict Management, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel) under the heading "The Israeli rationale."
"Avner Cohen and William Burr's "Israel Crosses the Threshold " (May/June 2006 Bulletin of Atomic Scientists) provides important insight into the U. S. government's understanding of response to Israel's Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) exceptionality during the late 1960s. However, Cohen and Burr largely neglect Israel's half of this dialogue "“ as well as the wider context, including the ongoing terror attacks.
They argue that the U.S. government had the power to force Israel to ratify the NPT and prevent it from developing a strategic deterrent. But the evidence clearly shows that un Israel's unique strategic environment, an option of last resort" was (and remains) irreplaceable. Israel's deep sense of insecurity "“ formed by the Holocaust and the costly 1948 Arab-Israeli war "“was reinforced during 1967 Six-Day War's buildup, which inspired a fear of annihilation. To their credit, President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger recognized Israel would not rely on an amorphous international framework like the NPT for its survival. In the early sixties, Washington traveled a similar road when President John F. Kennedy pressed Israeli Prime Minister David Ben- Gurion to open nuclear facilities at Dimona for international inspection. Nixon and Kissinger were probably familiar with this history.
By the time of the Nixon-Golda Meir meeting many U.S. Policy makers concluded that Israel possessed a deterrent capability. At this stage, NPT ratification and opening Israel's facilities to inspection was unlikely. (As the documents Cohen and Burr reveal in their article show, State Department officials who called for withholding aircraft to force Israel's hand failed to recognize that this only reinforced Israel's emphasis on an independent deterrent.) But unlike Iran, Iraq, and Libya, Israel didn't "flout the NPT," as the authors misleadingly claim. Israel carefully weighed the treaty's risk and benefits and never signed on. Thus the Nixon-Meir agreement confirmed the status quo and reinforced the "the don't ask, don't test" framework that seemed to be the best available option to both nations.
Indeed, the memos that provide the foundation for the author's analysis demonstrate the degree to which deliberate ambiguity succeeded in bringing Israeli deterrence requirements and American non-proliferation objectives together. The 1969 agreement was a major diplomatic accomplishment that provided stability in a volatile region. . If it becomes outdated, it will result from Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons and the NPT "˜s collapse, as new global arms control measures aren't realistic replacements for strategic deterrence in a Middle East where Iranian leaders threaten Israel's existence.
Gerald M. Steinberg
Director, Program on Conflict Management
Bar Ilan University
Ramat Gan, Israel.
>> Avner Cohen (author of Israel and the Bomb) and William Burr ,Respond: Gerald Steinberg's letter perplexes us, as he makes no objections whatsoever to the evidence we provided . Nowhere did we state (or even imply) that the United States was in a position to force Israel to sign the NPT or prevent it from possessing a nuclear weapons capability.
On the contrary it's obvious in the piece that most of the Nixon administration realized in one way or another that the United States was limited in what it could do to check the Israeli nuclear program, and most of them preferred to avoid any confrontation with Israel over this highly sensitive issue. The lone senior voices of mild dissent were Defense Secretary Melvin Laird and his deputy David Packard, but even they didn't push their views.
It's interesting to note, however, that what Steinberger sees as so evident and compelling today was not as clear cut in 1069. When Nixon and Kissinger struck the "don't ask, don't tell," deal with Israeli Prime Minister Meir in September 1969, they kept it secret, recognizing it as potentially controversial matter. At the time, very few top officials knew of the deal. What Steinberg also seems to ignore is that prior Meir's 1969 visit, Israeli decision makers felt great anxiety about future of their nuclear program. Indeed when Prime Minister Levi Eshkol died in February of 1969, he had no idea what position Israel would present to the United States regarding the NPT."
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US wants no nuclear accord with Pakistan
By Our Correspondent
WASHINGTON, Nov 18: Pakistan cannot get a similar nuclear deal as India because that's "a unique agreement with a unique country," says US Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns.
In a video-conference with reporters, Mr Burns assured India that Washington would remove its concerns about some of the restrictions prescribed in the bill the US Senate approved on Thursday."A similar agreement with Pakistan is not going to be possible. This is a unique agreement with a unique country," Mr Burns said. "As we have said we would not be seeking similar relief to American law for any other country."
He declined to comment on reports that China has agreed to provide similar assistance to Pakistan as the US is offering to India. Reports in the US media, however, have suggested that President Bush will take this up with his Chinese counterpart when they meet.
On Friday, some Indian officials said they still had concerns about "the language" of the bill US Senate passed by 85 to 12 votes. They objected to some of "the prescriptions" the bill contains but did not explain.
Undersecretary Burns acknowledged that New Delhi had raised some questions about the certifications and amendments detailed in the bill.
Mr Burns said he had extensive discussions over telephone with India's chief nuclear negotiator Shyam Saran following Thursday's vote. "There are some questions the Indian government has raised about language and certifications. We are talking to lawmakers and we hope the conference will iron out any remaining issues," he said.
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