INDIA – PAKISTAN HAVANA AGREEMENT (SEPTEMBER 2006) – PERSPECTIVES &
IMPLICATIONS
By Dr. Munawer Shar Baloch
Introductory observations
Pakistan's complicit linkages with the terrorist bombings in Mumbai
on 11 July 2006 (7/11) resulted in India's calling off the India-
Pakistan Peace Dialogue under way since January 2004. For the first
time the public opinion of India-at-large outpaced the Indian
Government's oft-repeated standard format responses in the dozens of
Pakistan-originated terrorist attacks in India since 2004 that: "This
will not be allowed to de-rail the on-going peace process".
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was forced by public opinion pressure
to come out with clear statements that Pakistan and its agencies were
involved and that terrorist attacks against India of such magnitude
cannot take place without moral, political and material support from
Pakistan.
The India-Pakistan Havana Agreement (September 2006) on the sidelines
of the NAM Summit was therefore neither dramatic nor historic. It
just reiterated that India had decided to resume the broken Peace
Dialogue with a "chicken-bone" thrown in and accepted by Pakistan
that both countries had agreed to set-up a "Joint Mechanism" to
cooperate in tackling terrorism.
By itself, the above would not have drawn so much anger and criticism
within India but for the following:
Indian Prime Minister's statements attributed by the media that: "The
fact is that terror is a threat to Pakistan. And it has been a
threat to India. We need to have a collective mechanism to deal with
it."
Indian High Commissioner in Pakistan and Foreign Secretary –
designate Menon who accompanied the Indian PM stating: "We must drive
a distinction between terrorist elements in Pakistan and the
Government of Pakistan. Pakistan too is a victim of terrorism."
India's security establishment, the Indian strategic community and
informed sections of Indian are aghast at such ineptitude being shown
at India's top-most levels in public declarations and giving clean
certificates to Pakistan on its involvement in terrorism against
India, when the facts indicate otherwise. Moreso, when the Prime
Minister himself had been saying so before he left for Havana. It
sets a dangerous precedent in that if the present Indian Prime
Minister can resile from India's stated and officially maintained
positions on Pakistan's proxy war and terrorism against India, he
could tomorrow retreat from the unanimous SPECIAL RESOLUTION of the
Indian Parliament of 1992 which explicitly declared that the issue of
Jammu and Kashmir is NON-NEGOTIABLE.
In effective terms the various statements of the Indian Prime
Minister and Indian Foreign Secretary (designate) amount to the
following:
India has condoned Pakistan's proven and sustained state-sponsored
terrorism against India of the last two decades.
General Musharraf's own complicity in this proxy war is exonerated.
The Indian Prime Minister opens himself to charges internationally
that all of India's statements on Pakistan's proxy war and the state
sponsored terrorism were unfounded.
Ironically, and tragically, this is reminiscent of Nehru defending
China in the run-up to 1962 and the obsession of "peace at any cost"
with China. Similarly, Foreign Secretary (designate) Menon's
statements arising from his stint as Indian High Commissioner in
Islamabad reminds one of the Indian Ambassador to China K. M.
Panikkar's wrong assessments on China fed to Nehru.
The Indian Prime Minister post-Havana has opened himself to very
strong charges from strategic and political analysts whose headings
of their columns so indicate:
"Agreement or Disaster"
"A Strategic Set-Back for India"
"Havana Misadventure Draws Flak at Home"
"Pakistan Let off the Hook by Clean Chit on Terrorism"
"Havana Will Haunt Us"
All of the above analyses effectively articulate the way India and
Indian national security interests stood sold out at Havana. It is
not the aim of this paper to re-capitulate them or the cogent points
made therein.
The aim of this paper is to take the discourse to a different level
in terms of perspectives and implications of the ill-conceived and
ill-advised new approach devised by the Indian Government headed by a
Congress Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh. Once again, he seems to
be on a sell-out to Pakistan of India's positions on terrorism as was
the fore-stalled sell-out on Siachen prevented earlier this year by
the force of Indian public opinion and opposition of India's security
establishment. Noises are being made on that account too once again
In terms of a discourse on perspectives and implications the
following questions come to the fore:
Were there any strategic imperatives which prompted the present
Indian Government to dilute India's stand on Pakistan's complicity in
the terrorist attacks against India?
Were there domestic compulsions which had put the Indian Government
under extreme pressure to capitulate on Pakistan's terrorism record?
Were India's security forces pressing for such a move, tired of
combating terrorism?
Was there an external pressure on India to temporize on Pakistan's
terrorism and Musharraf?
The first three questions can be given a short shrift by saying a NO,
very emphatically.
Strategically and politically, India today, if it knows how to use
the leverages of power, is in a position to call the shots in South
Asia and further afield. India's security forces have displayed
commendable endurance in combating the Pakistani terrorism campaign
for the last 20 years and have not complained.
India's domestic public opinion especially after Mumbai 7/11
overwhelmingly voted in surveys against resumption of an India-
Pakistan Peace Dialogue. The only domestic compulsion of the
Congress Party in power is the minority vote -bank in the coming
state elections.
The last question bears some more analysis along with some other
aspects. This paper addresses these in the following format:
The United States Pressures for India-Pakistan Peace Dialogue
Domestic Political Images of Musharraf and Manmohan Singh
Indian Prime Minister's Own Misgivings on the Agreement Post-Havana.
The Perennial Misgivings Attendant on an India-Pakistan Peace
Dialogue
Major Implications of the Agreement
The United States Pressure for India-Pakistan Peace Dialogue
The United States interest in South Asia has historically been
marginal. Its episodic reactivation of interest in South Asia has
been directly linked to the need-based emergence of some specific
United States national security interests. In relation to South Asia
today, the United States national security interests focus on
Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran.
To make it easier for readers to understand the United States linear
thinking in terms of its national security interests goes something
like this:
Afghanistan must emerge as a model of a moderate Islamic state with
democratic norms and institutions.
Afghanistan can so emerge if the Taliban threat from Pakistan is
neutralized.
Pakistan thus becomes pivotal for US national security interests.
Pakistan also becomes pivotal in relation to its strategic utility as
a springboard for any future US military intervention in Iran.
Pakistan's strategic utility to United States resides in the
personage of the military ruler General Musharraf.
General Musharraf's longevity in power in Pakistan is a strategic
imperative for the United States.
In view of his declining position in Pakistan, General Musharraf's
reputation and longevity has to be reinforced by external inputs.
With the above as an imperative, all pronouncements emanating from
the Washington establishment stress that India-Pakistan Peace is
essential if India has to emerge as a key global player; and that an
India-Pakistan Peace Dialogue irrespective of Pakistani provocations
is essential. Further it is advocated that the scenario of "who
after Musharraf?" would be very dismal and threatening for both the
United States and India.
So the point is that it is not that the United States is pro-
Pakistan, but that at the moment, strategic imperatives exist for the
United States not to allow any de-stabilization in Pakistan by a
political stand off with India in which India refuses to talk with
Pakistan under Musharraf. This would have a serious domestic
political impact within Pakistan. As maintained earlier by this
author, the United States pressurizes India to impart by proxy,
political legitimacy to Musharraf in South Asia by indulging in such
initiatives.
The United States has applied all political leverages on India in the
above direction. Even to the extent that at times it has been
implied that the success of the Indo-US Nuclear Deal gets dependant
on an India-Pakistan Peace Dialogue as US law-matters are sensitive
to it.
On his way home from Havana, the Indian Prime Minister sharply
reacted to any suggestion of US pressures to resume talks at Havana.
If that be so, then why the constant refrain from the Indian Prime
Minister that India cannot choose its geographical neighbors and that
since "General Musharraf is the ruler of Pakistan" India has to talk
to him.
This author would like to rebut the above with a simple argument.
Surely, India cannot choose its geographical neighbors, but India can
decidedly choose to which leadership in its geographical neighbors it
wishes to talk to. India should await the emergence of a democratic
leader in Pakistan and not have a dialogue with a military general
as "ruler".
Obviously, what emerges from the above is that India under United
States pressure is being made to fashion its foreign policy towards
Pakistan congruent with United States national security interests.
The United States pressures also seem to be evident in the Indian
Prime Minister's and Foreign Secretary (designate) clean chits to
Pakistan on terrorism. This is parroting the United States
position. It is regrettable that India too has gone in "a state of
denial" on Pakistani terrorism as has been the position of the United
States.
Democratic Political Images of Musharraf and Manmohan Singh
When foreign observers question as to whether the Havana Agreement
will take off, the answer depends also on the domestic political
images of Musharraf and Manmohan Singh as the leaders engaged in the
process.
Can these two carry along their domestic political constituencies and
public opinion along? Can they enthuse a wide cross section of their
peoples to go along with them?
The perspectives here are again dismal and cast a shadow on the peace
process. The respective political images of the two leaders are
illustrated below.
On, Musharraf, in a report from Lahore dated September 16, 2006, a
Pakistani journalist (DNA, September 17, 2006) has the following to
say:
"Pakistan President Musharraf is perceived by many in his country as
no more than a puppet of the United States who dances to Uncle Sam's
tune just to prolong his rule."
"Caught between Pakistanis who believe that he capitulated to an
American hegemonistic agenda and Western allies who think he is not
doing enough to create a terror-free modern Muslim state, Musharraf
is today a besieged leader."
"He could grab headlines at the UN General Assembly and in the United
States next week, but to his countrymen, the general is just a power-
hungry politician who has not delivered on promises."
Dr. Manmohan Singh similarly is not being perceived in any flattering
light, besides his image of bring on a tight political leash by the
Congress President. Seema Mustafa in an article (Asian Age,
September 16, 2006) has the following impressions to project:
"PM Manmohan Singh is seen as a man of the United States. At home
and abroad. There is little he can say and do now – apart from a
dramatic change in direction – that can convince the world that he
has an independent mind and does not constantly sneak looks at
Washington for a word of encouragement and praise".
"…..it is a fact that New Delhi now is hesitant to take a lead that
it thinks might worry or worse upset Washington …"
"Usually this is couched in sober language and a series of dance
steps that are sufficiently complicated to befool the people."
Such impressions of the two leaders' domestic public images do not
enthuse confidence that even with the best of intentions; the Peace
Dialogue can take off.
Indian Prime Minister's Own Misgivings on the Agreement Post – Havana
On the flight back from Havana, the Indian Prime Minister had a
lengthy press conference abroad his special flight aircraft. The
Indian Express carried a lengthy record of his statements to the
media.
Going through his statements quoted verbatim, and on analysis, the
following impressions emerge:
The Indian Prime Minister was defensive in his remarks on the Havana
Agreement.
The Prime Minister was not confident and enthused about what had been
agreed to.
All that was being given an exaggerated emphasis was that General
Musharraf had assured that Pakistan has no hand in perpetrating this
terrorism.
The so-called Joint Mechanism had not had even the initial contours
spelt out. It would be done in later negotiations.
There was a resigned air hovering on the Prime Minister when he
said "I believe that this is the best that we could get under the
circumstances" and that "whenever opportunities exist …. We should
toss all the balls in question."
That the prospects of the deal being successful were dismal, the
Prime Minister implied it as such when he stated: "I hope it works.
But if it does not work then we have to deal with the consequences. "
In terms of an overall analysis of this aspect what needs to be said
is that:
With the initial reactions that would have commenced reaching him,
the Indian Prime Minister realized that he had been ambushed by
General Musharraf in the one-to-one meeting and that he had conceded
more than what he could defend back home in India.
Indian Prime Ministers should never be left alone in a one-to-one
meeting with the Pakistani General. This was the lesson from the
Agra Summit.
Since the discussions impinged heavily on Indian national security
interests, the Defence Minister should have accompanied him for
consultations.
The Havana Agreement except for the decision to resume the stalled
talks does not signal any substantial achievement or advancement.
The Perennial Misgivings Attendant on an India – Pakistan Peace
Dialogue
There are a host of impediments which come into play. The more
prominent ones being the difference in approaches of the two
countries, namely:
Pakistan insists that Kashmir is the core issue and that everything
else revolves on this issue.
India insists that terrorism is the core issue and that now Pakistan
has enlarged it from Jammu & Kashmir to all over India.
Pakistan wants the peace talks to be determined by Musharraf's
domestic compulsions.
India insists that the pace has to be a measured me and graduated so
that the end-aim of sustainable India-Pakistan peace is achieved.
Added to the above is the "trust-deficit" between the two countries
and the lack of credibility and integrity in the Pakistani General's
personal image in India.
Lastly, in any conflict-resolution process in South Asia, the United
States is not considered as an "honest broker". One has analyzed
this in depth in the past. And when in India, people witness a
flurry of visits by US officials and US think-tank people in the run-
up to such events and in its wake, the impression gets confirmed that
the Indian Government is under US pressure. It is not acceptable to
India-at-large.
Major Implications of the Agreement
The major implications of this Agreement affect both India and
Pakistan and by extension on the United States also. The
implications are both strategic and political.
In India, the political implications are that the political
credibility of the Indian Prime Minister goes that many notches down
when perceived as succumbing to US pressures. In the instant case
there were no strategic imperatives for India to resume talks with
Pakistan. India should have waited for at least a year or two to see
the follow-up demonstrated pattern of Pakistan's sincerity Post
Mumbai 7/11.
Strategically, having condoned Pakistani involvement in its proxy war
and terrorism against India, the strategic options that India will
have to deal with future Pakistani acts of terrorism get that much
limited. The only option left would now be war.
Pakistan in terms of political and strategic implications finds
itself better placed. To add to its various plausible deniability
exits, it will now add the Indian Prime Ministers trump card of
having condoned Pakistan of any complicity in the terrorism campaign
against India. Strategically, it gives Pakistan breathing space to
divert its military resources on the LOC against Baluchistan.
Overall it does not have to restrain its agencies from the
continuance of proxy war and terrorism against India.
Between India and Pakistan, the United States enjoys a better
reputation in India. Pakistan is totally anti -US. Bolstering of
Musharraf longevity in power only reinforces anti-US feelings in
Pakistan. In the process the United States over-draws from its fixed-
deposit of goodwill in India. For the future such stances will
impinge on the development of any possible effective Indo-US
strategic partnership.
Concluding Observations
The Havana Agreement between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and
General Musharraf has drawn extremely sharp responses and opposition
from the Indian security community, the Indian strategic community
and India-at-large. This strong opposition can be analyzed as on two
counts. Firstly, India should have waited for a reasonable period of
time after Mumbai 7/11 for the Pakistani General to prove the
bonafides of his assertions that Pakistan was not involved in
terrorism against India. The Pakistani record under General
Musharraf since January 2004 speaks otherwise.
Secondly, on what authority and on whose prodding the Indian Prime
Minister did a U-turn by condoning Pakistan's complicity in terrorism
when for weeks after Mumbai 7/11 he had been proclaiming it
otherwise.
A section of Indian media's editorials have defended this decision on
the grounds that India could indulge in a "bit of diplomatic
adventurism" to break the deadlock in Indo-Pakistan dialogue. They
do not seem to learn from the lessons of India's military history and
the adverse strategic costs to India's national security arising from
Indian political idealism.
So what is the way ahead? My oft-repeated answer: let the natural
balance of power prevail in South Asia. This is the lesson that the
United States too has to recognize if it wishes to "insure" her
future national security interests in this region.
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