How democracy works in Pakistan

No election in a developing nation is today complete without its attendant teams of election observers from a wide range of institutions whose work is relevant to the country concerned: the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe, the (United States) National Democratic Institute (NDI), the Commonwealth Secretariat, the European Union, and a kaleidoscope of NGOs. More often than not, they rubber-stamp the proceedings, albeit with some qualifications. Having done observer duty with the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan in two general elections, I have seen my foreign counterparts being given the run-around by a practised bureaucracy. It is not a pretty sight.

It isn't that the visiting teams are gullible: the problem is that they are looking at what takes place on election-day itself, while the rigging might have begun months earlier. And to be honest, on the two occasions I went from one polling station to another in Karachi, I found very little evidence of obvious vote-tampering. But the overall results were very different from what observers had forecast, with official candidates faring far better than anybody had expected. What then, is going on?

Pakistan's eight-step reel

The techniques used by the authorities to secure the election result they want are many and varied. Here are eight tried and tested mechanisms.

Incumbency: In democracies everywhere, incumbency gives the ruling party a huge advantage. But in Pakistan, elections "normally" take place after the sitting government has been ejected by the president with the army's support. An interim government is then installed to supervise the next election which, under the constitution, must take place within three months of the dissolution of the national and provincial assemblies.

The fact that the interim government is stacked with politicians opposed to the previous government ensures that the dice are loaded. From Zia ul-Haq's death in 1988 to Pervez Musharraf's coup in 1999, Pakistan held four general elections: Benazir Bhutto (December 1988-August 1990, July 1993-November 1996) and Nawaz Sharif (November 1990-July 1993, February 1997-October 1999) were confirmed in their alternating dance at playing the prime minister. The dates of their tenure indicate that neither came even close to completing the normal five-year period before being removed.

Supervision: In the three-month window between overthrow and election, the interim government uses the time at its disposal to make major changes within the bureaucracy. The chief election commissioner is supposedly a neutral figure with a fixed tenure, and therefore immune to pressure. In reality, he invariably rules against appeals from the opposition, while upholding claims from officially anointed candidates.

The federal Election Commission of Pakistan supervises the provincial electoral machinery, especially in the preparation of electoral rolls. These lists are provided to polling stations a couple of days before the election, giving voters no time to lodge appeals if their names are not on it. In theory, they can contact the local election office for confirmation, but few manage to do so.

Identity: National identity cards are another way of disenfranchising large numbers of voters, especially women. Over the years, these ID cards have become mandatory for documents like driving and arms licences, as well as passports. But the vast majority of Pakistani women have no occasion to apply for these, so they don't bother cutting through the red tape necessary to get an ID card.

The election commission, seeing an opportunity to manipulate elections without seeming to, now insists that citizens produce ID cards in order to cast their vote. Since the majority of women who do vote, especially in Punjab and Sindh, tend to support the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), it is Benazir Bhutto who is most affected by this requirement.

Qualification: General Musharraf went one step further in the elections held in October 2002 by insisting that all candidates must be graduates. This caused pandemonium in the major political parties as many landlords, traditional candidates from the rural areas, had never been to university.

Mysteriously, a few of them suddenly acquired degrees, some of which were challenged before the ECP. But the religious parties were hit the hardest by the new rule - until the commission agreed provisionally to accept their madrasa certificates as equivalent to BA degrees. If it had not been for this generous interpretation of what constitutes a university education, Pakistan's assemblies might have been deprived of the collective wisdom of its clergy.

Politicisation: While the state machinery goes into overdrive to help "official" candidates, the authorities shuffle police and district officers around the provinces to boost these candidates's chances of victory. The ever-diminishing number of neutral, apolitical bureaucrats are shunted into sinecures, or posted to the provincial capitals, away from the action. When nomination papers are filed, the documents submitted by opposition candidates are subjected to minute scrutiny, and the smallest flaw entails rejection. This is why political parties always have "covering candidates" whose papers are filed in case the major candidate is knocked out even before the elections.

Media: There are now many private TV and radio channels available to political parties in Pakistan to push their message, but the state-owned Pakistan Television and Radio Pakistan still have the largest networks. An added attraction for the ruling party is it does not have to pay to have its political agenda broadcast. And when the prime minister, his or her cabinet colleagues, or their provincial counterparts are out on the election trail, it goes without saying that their campaigning is underwritten by the exchequer.

Finance: The election commission always has a potent weapon in reserve: the limit on spending by candidates, fixed at an absurdly low figure that, were it observed, would make it impossible for a candidate to run an effective campaign. After the election, candidates are supposed to submit details of their expenses to the commission. However, as everybody knows these figures cannot be accurate, the winning candidate's victory can always be challenged.

Manipulation: Even these infractions pale into insignificance when compared with the real thuggery that goes on behind the scenes. Strong opposition candidates are known to have been blackmailed by intelligence agencies into either withdrawing or switching sides. Often, they are shown incriminating documents, or told that banks will foreclose on any loans they have taken.

While these shenanigans take place at the time of filing nomination papers, arm-twisting continues until the elections. All this time, protests pour into the election commission - which routinely dismisses them. In one case I am personally familiar with, a PPP candidate in Lahore in the 2002 election was declared the winner after the provisional count. By the morning, the official media had overturned this result in favour of his Islamist opponent.

One huge payout the ECP never questioned was the 100 million-rupee slush fund operated by the ISI during the 1988 elections to ensure that Benazir Bhutto did not win an outright victory. This disclosure was made before the supreme court by Lieutenant-General Asad Durrani, ex-director of Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) military agency, during hearings of a charge brought by Air-Marshall Asghar Khan. However, this scandal was the tip of the iceberg: the ISI has traditionally played a sinister, behind-the-scenes role in every recent election. It will doubtless do so in the elections provisionally scheduled for 2007-08.

By the time the long-suffering Pakistani voters make their way to the polling-station on election-day, the meal has been well and truly cooked. On the day itself, open rigging is generally confined to rural areas where outside observers seldom reach. Here, the sympathies of entire villages are known to the local administration, so roads are blocked to prevent voters from reaching polling stations. In socially underdeveloped areas like Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province, women simply are not allowed by their men to go out to vote.

So the next time you read that the Commonwealth Secretariat team, for example, has certified elections to be "free and fair," barring some minor inconsistencies, be suspicious. Be very suspicious.