A Strategy for Exit from Afghanistan  

Usman Khalid

As the "˜war on terror' in Afghanistan becomes more costly in NATO lives, and its spread to Pakistan faces the wrath of the people, cool heads have started to think of an exit strategy. However, the consensus in the US still is that the military should pull out from Iraq and reinforce Afghanistan. Why? No good reasons are given except that the US invasion of Iraq was a mistake because: Iraq was not a threat, whereas Afghanistan has been the home of Al-Qaeda; the invasion of Iraq diverted attention and resources to the wrong target. More recently, the neo-cons have started to say that neither country posed a threat; the only Muslim country that is a nuclear power is Pakistan; that should have been the target. But demonisation and isolation of Pakistan "“ pre-requisites for a successful invasion "“ which has been a close ally for five decades, is not so easy. Therefore, the general view is that Pakistan should be made to comply by the use of carrot before the stick is used. America is so blatantly micro-managing Pakistan now causing uproar in the country. The people expected the "˜free elections' to deliver a new government, but Musharraf still reigns as well as rules. Almost everyone in Pakistan believes, because that is what the US wants.

          The truth, however, may be different. Afghanistan is now a NATO theatre of operations. European countries are doubtful of a military victory in that country and want a negotiated settlement or an exit strategy, preferably both. The Americans still want a "˜victory' but have no idea what victory would look like. If the USA got its way, there would be no settlement. The USA would exit upon India taking over its role in Afghanistan. And how would India fill the vacuum? It would create the situation prior to 1979 when Afghanistan was friendly to India and the Soviet Union and hostile to Pakistan. But the long-term effects would be more far reaching. Russia would be able to regain its control of Central Asian Republics and Afghanistan. India would like Pakistan to be the new buffer state between an Indian Empire and a rejuvenated Russian Empire. Indian diplomats have been trying to sell their imperial dream to America as the best interest of the USA also. Diplomats are trained to conceal their purpose; they only reveal the bare minimum necessary to get goodwill for their project. The exit strategy proposed by India is that the USA do nothing; just leave an unpopular anti-Pakistan regime in place and leave. Since it does not require America to do much except to bankroll an unpopular government, even the new US Administration would buy it. The result would be a drawn out war in Afghanistan that is bound to spread into all areas of Pakistan.

The downside of the exit strategy proposed by India is that the dividend of the war in Afghanistan against Soviet occupation would be lost. It is hard to say if America cares. In its present view of the world, Islam is its arch enemy. Since Central Asian Republics, Afghanistan and Pakistan are all Muslim countries, why should America worry if these countries fight each other and go under Russian- Indian tutelage? However, there is a chance, however remote, that America may like to prevent war and slaughter in countries it helped liberate "“ Afghanistan and Central Asian Republics. There is a very tangible benefit to the US from not opting for the exit strategy proposed by India. Pakistan has an alternative to offer that would preclude Russia regaining control of the resources of Central Asia Republics thus allowing the American and European companies to develop the resources of Central Asia. What is the exit strategy proposed by Pakistan?

  The Pakistani proposal is based on recognition of legitimate interests of both sides. Pakistan wants that Afghanistan should be friendly country which is a bridge with Central Asia, and that Central Asian Republics should not return to Russian control. Since Pakistan provides the only route to Central Asian Republics that does not pass through Russia or China, a friendly Pakistan is just as vital to the US and Europe as friendly Afghanistan. It has indeed been a great triumph of Indian diplomacy that the shared objectives of Pakistan and the USA receive so little attention and the reluctance of Pakistan to slaughter its own people makes headlines in the USA. In this costly oversight, India is helped by the ineptitude of Pakistan's leadership whose grasp of foreign policy is revealed by the fact that the only change in sixty years is that instead of "˜brotherly relations' with all Muslim countries; "˜friendly relations with India' is now the main objective of foreign policy. One wonders if the change is the result of micro-management of the affairs of Pakistan by America or revulsion for the military that has allowed this to happen? It is probably both! The result is that Pakistan is unstable and would remain so in perpetuity thus allowing India to sell its proposal for exit strategy from Afghanistan.

The most blatant US intervention into the internal affairs of Pakistan was made possible by the desire of Musharraf to continue as President for another five years knowing full well how much he is hated. Benazir Bhutto, out of power for eleven long years, could not resist the temptation of a come back.  The deal between Benazir and Musharraf was openly underwritten by the USA as well as the UK. Under this deal: 1) Benazir Bhutto, her allies and accomplices, were given amnesty in all the civil and criminal cases; 2) she agreed to Musharraf continuing as President for another five years; 3) Musharraf agreed to facilitate her becoming the Prime Minster for the third time; 4) the judiciary was to be made acquiescent to Executive diktat by several measures that included the removal of Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, replacing him with Justice Abdul Hamid Dogar, withdrawing suo moto powers of the courts,  and making such changes to the procedure for selection, appointment and promotion of judges that they effectively became subordinate to the executive branch. 

          Asif Zardari has been a privy to the secret deal and is now under pressure not to impeach President Musharraf even though he knows that an administration that accepts him even as a figurehead President would also be highly unpopular. America alone can secure his release from the deal with Musharraf but Asif Zardari has proved to be so inept in handling the restoration of judges dismissed by General Musharraf that he has undermined the alliance with Nawaz Sharif that was the guarantee against his party's hold on power being challenged. It is easy to blame it all on Asif Zardari. But his "˜failure to sustain himself in power' through popular alliances is a part of Musharraf's survival plan. Asif Zardari is so badly cornered that he needs the US as well as Musharraf more than they need him. 

More important to the people of Pakistan is not the fate of Musharraf or of Asif Zardari, it is peace and order in the country. Neither Musharraf not Asif Zardari have any clear objective other than survival. But the interplay of external and internal forces is complex, and it never stops. Lack of self-confidence and alertness in Pakistan's leaders has allowed the war for the liberation of Afghanistan to be shifted to Pakistan's soil. The situation in Pakistan is very similar to that of 1971 prior to Indian invasion of Pakistan. No wonder the press in Pakistan has started to call Musharraf YK2 (Yahya Khan the Second) after the supremely confident blunderbuss President who led Pakistan to defeat in 1971 War with India.

The victory of India in 1971 War was underpinned by three factors: 1) the leading political party (the Awami League) was under such commanding influence of India that it was unconcerned with any national interest of Pakistan state or its people; 2) the demand for "˜provincial autonomy' entailed in his Six Points had transformed his election campaign into a veritable movement for the secession of East Pakistan; 3) the Indian and Western propaganda demonised the Pakistan Army in the eyes of the people of East Pakistan. India, and to a great extent America, are trying to replicate the 1971 situation of East Pakistan now in West Pakistan. If the PML (N)- PPP coalition broke down, it will be replaced by PPP-PML (Q)-MQM alliance, and Pakistan would have a coalition of leaders who are not overly concerned with national interests; all the leaders of "˜coalition of liberals' Musharraf is working towards are eager to work for India's agenda. The exit of PML(N) from coalition would create such a charged political environment that a demand for more "˜provincial autonomy' could transform into a movement for the break up of the country on ethnic lines. This is also a "˜declared objective' of the USA. (Ralph Peters map of the Broader Middle East made the designs of the US policy makers public.)

In 1971, the Army as an institution enjoyed wide public support. It was successfully demonised in East Pakistan for a period and for a purpose and India succeeded there. Now the situation is much more serious. Musharraf is not just unpopular; he is hated. Since he has no obvious support in the country, it is believed that the Army still supports him. That is why Army is once again the target of suicide bombers after a brief respite awaiting the exit of Musharraf and a change in policy. The PPP is also anti-Army but in a different way. The leaders of the ruling PPP "“ one of who is the Defence Minister now - have publicly said why do we need such a big army? If we made peace with India, he said, we would only need a small army like in Bangladesh. (Which has a three-division army, no Navy or Air Force.) The author of an India sponsored book "˜Military Inc.' is now a visiting professor in the USA although she is civil servant not an academic. Demonisation of the Pakistan Army is an important part of the plan for the disintegration of Pakistan as vital as "˜a government not overly concerned about national interests, and a movement for "˜provincial autonomy'.  

A secessionist fringe already exists alongside the "˜provincial autonomy' movement, which is quite overt and active among Diaspora Sindhis and Baloch. The support given to the secessionist fringe shows that the Indian and Zionist lobbies are active in their support. In Baluchistan, the BLA (Baluchistan Liberation Army) has been funded, organised and equipped by India. In Sindh, the MQM (Mohajir Qaumi Movement) is the surrogate of India. The "˜provincial autonomy' is being championed by the three ruling parties the PPP, the ANP and the MQM. In 1971, it was the Bengalis who complained of being victimised. Now every ethnic group complains of being victims. Ethnic parties do not realise, or do not mind, that ethnic slaughter is self-perpetuating; if it begins, it continues until ethnic cleansing is obtained. In East Pakistan, the ethnic minority of Bihari Muslims was small and could not have oppressed the huge majority of Bengalis. Yet, they were branded "˜collaborators' and massacred; they continue to be oppressed with relish thirty-six years later. That is the nature of ethnic fires that "˜provincial autonomy' can ignite. Pakistan is sleep walking into it with enthusiastic support from the present government. The PPP under Asif Zardari is no different to the Awami League "“ just as eager to follow Indian diktat just as unconcerned with national interests.

 The military that takes over the country so often and whose Chief gets so glued to the chair of the President that the country cannot get rid of him without him being killed, deposed by another General or defeated by India, deserve to be despised by the people. It would not be such a bad thing except that the Army may well be required to fight the enemies of the country. The armed forces reviled by the media and hated by the people can never defend the very same people. In modern warfare, demonisation of the Soldiers of the enemy is a potent weapon of war. Pakistan is faced with ethnic/tribal militancy in Baluchistan and Islamic militancy in the North. The former demonise it as "˜Punjabi Army' and the latter as America's collaborators. The new civil government is inclined to deal with both insurgencies through negotiations. But America wants the Pakistan Army to crush the popular Islamic resistance and negotiate with anti-state insurgency in Baluchistan. If Pakistan yielded under American pressure, it would be fighting the wrong enemy and would be roundly defeated.  

As stated above, Pakistan has interests in Afghanistan it shares with America. Soon rather than late, NATO troops would have to leave Afghanistan. It is logical for the US to want to leave behind a friendly and stable government that kept Al-Qaeda out. It could NOT achieve that objective by destabilising Pakistan and encouraging ethnic insurrection as it is doing. In such a backward area as Afghanistan and the North West Pakistan, social ethos can sustain slaughter almost forever. War and insurrection that started in 1979 has continued for three decades already. But there is an alternative, which is to accept that the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan has almost disappeared; that the socio-economic integration of the two countries is almost complete. It is wise to underpin that with a formal "˜customs union'. That would allow the enterprising Afghans to do what they do best "“ trade with destinations near and far to become harbingers of peace and free trade.

Free traders will bring the peace that the fighters denied the country for thirty years. The Central Government of Afghanistan controls its provincial governors by use of its power to dismiss and transfer, and also by withholding funds. The USA can take a leaf out of the same book. American civil presence would then be welcome, as Afghanistan desperately needs budget support. Under a formal "˜customs union', the Afghans would force their government to be friendly with Pakistan so that trade is not hindered. The objective of transforming Afghanistan from a barrier to a bridge would not be achieved by administrators or soldiers; it will be obtained by "˜free trade'.  If Pakistan wants to keep India out, its reasons are geo-political, not arbitrary or wedged in "˜contest' with India.  If the USA acquiesced in letting India be its Viceroy in Afghanistan, the bad old days of "˜squeezing Pakistan' between two hostile neighbours would return. That would not be good for Afghans or Pakistanis. The Americans have to choose. They can opt for the Indian proposal, perpetuate war and be ousted from Central Asia. They could opt for the Pakistan centric exit strategy, bring peace, and retain the wherewithal for maintaining a presence in Central Asia. The choice is America's.

The writer is the Director London Institute of South Asia (LISA)