Nation in the line of fire
By M. Ziauddin
http://www.dawn. com/weekly/ dmag/dmag1. htm
The seventh anniversary of General Musharraf's one-man rule is marked by a boastful autobiography. Among other things, his attempts to humiliate certain known and respected names render him totally unworthy of the two august and apolitical offices that he has arrogated to himself for seven long years
PRESIDENT General Pervez Musharraf enters the eighth year of his rule with a boastful book to boot. The book is so pompous that after reading it one thought its title should have been 'I, the Superman'. He has presented himself as an all-knowing, all-powerful person dedicated to fighting evil and the enemies of Pakistan . Like the comic-book character who dons his superman suit the minute he gets a call from the victims of evil-doers and off flies into the skies to rescue (mostly) the damsels in distress, the president also sets a lot of store by his uniform and has actually claimed on a number of occasions that without the uniform he would not last a single minute. And recently he claimed that it was his uniform which enabled him to persuade the otherwise obscurantist parliament to consider the Women Protection Bill.
But then by the time you finish the book you also get the feeling that it is the nation as a whole which is the line of Musharraf's fire, not the other way around as he tries to establish page after page. Very few of those whom he has mentioned in the book have escaped his demolition job. And in every contemporary event that he mentions in this book, he emerges as the hero. At places he is also seen playing the proverbial Don Quixote, running against self-created windmills in his full military regalia and, of course, winning hands down. In short, he has made a self-serving fiction out of history.
And, as expected no sooner had the book hit the book stalls, almost every one of his claim or his version of history and events went up in smoke. Even his political bosom pal Chaudhry Shujaat Husain, who is one of those few who are spared Musharraf's conceited attacks, has disagreed in his own roundabout way with the president's version of how the PML (Q) came into being.
The general has dealt the worst blow to his own institution by alleging that promotions in the Army are manipulated. His attempts to present the Kargil misadventure as a victory, and the Agra talks as a failure of the then Indian prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee are perhaps the most blatant misrepresentation of facts ever heard about these events. And his attempts to humiliate the persons of Lt-Gen.(retd) Ali Kuli Khan and Dr A.Q. Khan render him totally unworthy of the two august and apolitical offices that he has arrogated to himself without so much as your leave, please.
One can write a book about the book, but let us leave that for some other time. Let us see what the country has gained and lost in the last seven long years of Musharraf's one-man rule, and also do some crystal ball gazing to see where he would take us in the next 12 months. First, the crystal ball gazing. Will he or won't he give up the uniform?
It seems that the purpose of his last visit to Europe, the US and the UK was to persuade his promoters in the rich capitals to allow him to continue for five more years with the system of governance that he has developed since 2002 under which the chief of the army rules with dictatorial powers, while the elected parliament serves as the democratic façade. He also wants them not to make him replace his current political friends, the MMA and the PML (Q), with the PPP and the PML (N). Going by the body language of Musharraf during the tour, it appears he has succeeded in getting the approval from the right quarters to continue with the hybrid system of governance.
The MMA has shown that it has perfected the art of running with the hare and hunting with the hounds. This suits Musharraf perfectly. The MMA has never created any problems for Musharraf in the NWFP where it rules single-handedly and also in Balochistan where it is in partnership with the ruling PML (Q). Throughout the Waziristan campaign, the neighboring NWFP whose government shares many of the ideals of the tribal people fighting against the Pakistani Army kept the province calm and peaceable without even a single protest rally on the streets.
In Balochistan the PML (Q)-MMA coalition government had endorsed the army action against the so-called miscreants and recently the MMA kept the government from falling by refusing to withdraw in protest against the murder of Akber Bugti. It was with the MMA votes that the controversial 17th amendment was passed which has given dictatorial powers to General Musharraf, and it was also the MMA which had helped the ruling coalition at the centre to make laws to enable the president to rule in uniform for five years by getting an endorsement from the electoral collage rather than by contesting for the office as per the procedure given in the Constitution.
The MMA knows that it would never get such a massive political space in a genuinely democratic dispensation. And Musharraf knows that for this reason alone the MMA would help him get another term in uniform.
The case of the PML (Q) is not very different. Most of the people in this party belong to that section of ruling elite which can never countenance a role that keeps them away from the corridors of power. It is a bunch of opportunists and their need for a uniformed president is perhaps much greater than that of Musharraf himself because perhaps they know that they would not even get elected in a truly fair and free election. So, the PML (Q) and a uniformed president appear to be mutually dependent on each other.
This leads one to just one conclusion: Musharraf in uniform will get himself 'endorsed' as the president in August-September next year for one more term from the present parliament promising both the PML(Q) and MMA that by way of trade-off he would allow them to rig the 2007 election so that they could come back more strongly.
But why is the uniform so essential for him? He has never been able to give a convincing answer to the question. On the day he went back on the promise to doff the uniform he told the nation that he needed the uniform to tackle, among other things, extremism and terrorism and maintain and provide the much needed continuity to economic policies and deepen harmony among political, bureaucratic and military institutions. Last year at the height of the earthquake crisis he went so far as to say that had he not been in uniform, the chief of the army staff would have taken his own sweet time responding to an SOS from a civilian prime minister calling for assistance in the relief and rescue operations.
But despite him being in uniform it took the Army almost a week to gear up the relief and rescue campaign. One can not but acknowledge that once the Army took up position in the earthquake area, it did an excellent job. But one should also not ignore the crucial role played by the international help that came in without any loss of time, and in plenty. The air sorties that were undertaken in an unprecedented numbers by the NATO and the air force of other countries to bring in relief goods, doctors and even complete hospitals, had done more than half the relief and rescue job for the Pakistan Army.
However, the reconstruction work for which the donors have already pledged over $5 billion has been marred by delays of red tape, confusion and corruption. And with winter about to set in, only 10 per cent of reconstruction is said to have been completed. The Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency (ERRA) is being accused of moving too slowly either because of the inbuilt difficulties of official red tape or because of alleged corruption and inefficiency within its hierarchy.
On October 12, 1999 , while taking over the country's reins Musharraf had promised to give a corruption-free government and a government that would bring harmony among the federating units. But in the last seven years of his rule corruption has increased manifold and provincial harmony has been destroyed first by him insisting that he would build Kalabagh come what may, and then by sending in his troops into Balochistan and Waziristan to establish what he believes to be writ of the state.
Let us see what has happened on the corruption front in the meanwhile. Pakistanis pay as much as Rs45 billion annually by way of bribes to get their work done by the lower echelon of officials, according to the latest findings of the Pakistan Chapter of Transparency International. But then this is peanuts compared to the mega billions that are being made by the unscrupulous in the name of free enterprise and market economy. The crash of the stock exchanges was allegedly manipulated by a cartel of four or five big stock brokers. The sugar and cement cartels floated by some of the cabinet members made the prices of these two commodities go through the roof by indulging in hoarding and black-marketing.
Earlier, oil marketing companies indulged in price fixing with the full backing of the government. 'Friends' have been allowed to grab huge plots of land at throwaway prices at the pretext of setting up car-making plants for the high-end market which is so limited in Pakistan that without an export market, it would be a totally losing preposition. So, what are they up to, then? Well, the same old rip-off. Import these luxury cars for the next three years at concessional duties and then abandon the plan as unfeasible and use the land bought cheaply for other more lucrative purposes.
The privatization of the Pakistan Steel Mills is perhaps the biggest scandal of the present government if one went by the detailed judgment of the Supreme Court which annulled the deal. But not only no one was held responsible and made accountable for commissions and omissions pointed out by the Supreme Court in the process, the government instead has filed a review petition with the Supreme Court, seeking reversal of its judgment. If no corruption was involved in the process of the PSM's privatization then why did the Supreme Court annul the deal? And would not the future buyers of units on the privatization block be warned off wondering that if there was nothing wrong with the PSM deal, then why did the SC second-guess it?
Musharraf's obsession with Kalabagh had brought the country almost to a breaking point, with the three smaller provinces and Punjab arrayed against each other in a bitter but unnecessary fight. It took him almost four years to get through his head the futility of pursuing this extremely unpopular dam. And by the time he was forced to choose Diamir Bhasha dam, Pakistan had lost precious time with regard to efforts needed to cope with looming water and power shortages.
Next, his obsession with the writ of the state without understanding its implications in a federal setup has pushed Balochistan and Waziristan to the wall. He does not perhaps understand that the writ of the state in a federation cannot be imposed on the federating units with brute force. It is a state of mind of the people of the federating units that have volunteered to be part of the federation by giving up a part of their respective residual sovereignty to the federal government. The assets of Balochistan belong to the people of that province. They can be shared by the other provinces with the permission of the owners of the asset, but they cannot be appropriated in the name of the federation.
One cannot eliminate Sardari system from Balochistan by murdering Sardar Akber Khan Bugti. Guns do not bring in social and democratic changes. The sole superpower of the world is learning this the hard way in Iraq and Afghanistan . But then before this lesson sinks in, it might be too late because Balochistan today has been rendered by Musharraf ripe for all kinds of adventurers to move in. The Indians, the US, the Iranians, the Afghans, the Chinese and the UAE all have, or perceive to have, strategic self-interest in Balochistan. And it would be too naive on our part to think that they would play fair and not try to take full advantage of our self-created crisis in that province.
When Musharraf goaded by the US sent in 80,000 Pakistani troops to Waziristan to flush out the so-called foreign Al-Qaeda militants from the tribal belt, few in this country thought it was a prudent move. In fact, many cried out in pain because they feared that in trying to do the US bidding, Musharraf had gone on a killing spree of his own people. And there were many more who said defeat awaited the Pakistani Army in the tribal belt. And they were proved right finally. This has thrown up a new problem for the country. Now the Taliban rule the roost even in the settled areas inside the NWFP province and cross over to Afghanistan freely to fight on the side of the Afghan Taliban. How does the nation cope with this situation? There is no answer to this riddle except that perhaps once again the issue of Durand Line would rear its head, threatening the country's geographical integrity.
Musharraf's biggest failure has been his success in keeping the war on terror a personal war. He has kept the nation out of this war through his two political arms - the PML (Q) and the MMA - both of whom subscribe to the ideals of an obscurantist Islam, the former to a lesser degree and the latter to an extreme degree. These two forces have been defeating all his so-called attempts to promote Enlightened Moderation in the country. The two did not even let him remove the religion column from the passports. We continue to let our children be taught religious bigotry because the MMA and PML (Q) would not let the syllabus be changed. We let innocent people suffer incarceration on charges of blasphemy because Musharraf's political friends do not let him change the relevant law. We allow our women to suffer in perpetuity because the MMA and the PML (Q) do not let the parliament reform the Hudood laws. That is why despite his claims of personal victories in the war against terror, Pakistan is increasingly coming under the influence of religious obscurantism.
His other failure has been his success in keeping the peace negotiations with India from reaching its logical conclusion. And he has not helped the process in any way by treating the subject the way he has done in his book. He and his institution perhaps still believe that the international pressure and the threat of terrorism would force the Indians eventually to give up what he could not snatch from them in the battlefield. He appears to be totally blind to the opportunity that the Kashmir-related CBMs have offered for resolving the conflict. These CBMs possess the potential for ushering in a new way of life for the strife ridden region on both sides of the LoC which in due course of time may create social, economic and political linkages between the two Kashmirs and in the process unifying the Kashmiri nation and strengthening its bargaining position viz-Ã -viz both India and Pakistan.
India does need the transit route to Afghanistan and Central Asia very badly, but it would be a folly to think that any government in India would have the powers to trade Kashmir for transit routes without going to parliament, and it would be a bigger folly to think that in India, Constitution can be messed up as easily as it happens in Pakistan. Allowing India the transit routes and giving it the MFN status would be mutually beneficial in the economic context without in any way undermining the respective political positions on Kashmir. Therefore, it would be in the national interest of Pakistan to stop pressing India for immediate talks on Kashmir and focus more at the moment on enlarging the CBMs for Pakistan's own benefit and that of the people of Kashmir's economic gains and let Mr Time, the great healer, do the needful on our behalf. China used this strategy to its advantage in the case of Hong Kong and is doing the same in the case of Taiwan. So why can't we also do the same, and allow Mr Time to resolve the Kashmir issue?
It would be dishonest not to give some credence to his claim of having turned around the national economy. The country has achieved an annual average growth rate of nearly seven per cent in the last three years. Foreign exchange reserves are more than adequate to meet almost half-year's import bill. Remittances are bringing in about $5 billion on an average annually. Privatization proceeds went up to almost $3 billion last year. Exports have more than doubled. But it would also be dishonest not to acknowledge the contribution of 9/11 bonanza to this seemingly shinning economy.
And it would also be dishonest not to take serious note of the widening gap between the rich and the poor and between the regions. Poverty in Pakistan is increasingly getting concentrated in backward regions, such as Balochistan, large parts of NWFP, the tribal areas, southern Punjab and the interior of Sindh. Faster growth without equitable distribution is choking up all the development avenues.
The unhindered use of the principles of free market and a blind faith in the trickle-down theory seem to be leading the country to an economic collapse of gigantic proportions. The ruling elite comprising the feudal aristocracy, the big business, the civil-military bureaucracy and the educated middle classes, is making it impossible to reform the system so that it becomes more equitable. They are resisting the reforms in the mistaken belief perhaps that they would lose in the process. Unless Musharraf realizes the need to urgently put in place statutory regulatory mechanisms to bring under control the free-for-all that he has permitted in the name of market economy, the expanding sea of poverty would soon drown the little islands of prosperity which President General Pervez Musharraf seems to have mistaken for broadbased national riches.
The other view
By Najeeb Anjum
PRESIDENT General Pervez Musharraf's recently released memoirs have aroused unprecedented public interest in and outside Pakistan . Never in history has media attention of such magnitude been showered on any Pakistani leader of any stature. It was rather ironic that TV channels much before the book hit the stores had started reviewing the book on the basis of excerpts alone that were carried by certain newspapers. While some of the participants were honest enough to admit that they had not read the book, they still troubled themselves to appear on TV channels. Such half-cooked discussions only found faults with the effort, and gave rise to conspiracy theories. Strangely enough, no review brought forth the real essence of the book which lies in the author's middle class upbringing.
Musharraf's non-conformist behaviour since his childhood is reflective of the set of middle-class values inherited from his parents who were trained in Victorian values. Due to its candid and engaging style, the contents are appealing to a cross-section of people. While the detractors continue to bicker over one thing or the other, it has not diminished the book's ever-growing demand. Millions of people are finding it easy to relate to the contents of the book. It is for the first time, it seems, that the middle class has found a voice, with the president breaking all the taboos attached to the highest office of the land.
There is an oft repeated lamentation that the poor masses of the country have never been taken into confidence by the powers that be. But when the president himself laid bare the facts, all hell broke loose. Episodes involving the Kargil conflict, Dr A.Q. Khan or the events in the wake of 9/11 are a clear indication of what is being suggested.
In this context, the mention of the battle for Gallipoli, which is officially described as "one of the world's classic tragedies" and one of the most controversial and disastrous British campaigns, would provide a fitting comparison where even after 90 years the academic debate is on and new insights of that doomed campaign are being provided for public knowledge. The role of Churchill and Montgomery in World War II is being re-defined in the light of new research material. They both leapt into print after the War with a highly contentious version of events. Churchill concealed his own role in the 1920s and shifted the blame on to his opponents. Montgomery inherited a winning position at El Alamein and as the commander in Normandy single-handedly wrecked Anglo-American relations.
Those jumping to hasty conclusions, therefore, would do well to let the historians have the last word. Similarly, the endless criticism on General Musharraf for his comments on A.Q. Khan seems merely out of rhetoric than based on any fact itself. We still dwell in archaic ages where if a person is revered, we adorn him with divinity. We forget that even our heroes are humans, and to err is human.
Talking of the human capacity to err, one is reminded of the many typographical and editing mistakes in the book which certainly work as a put-off even though the publishers had a huge reputation to take care of. One such mistake has mis-spelled "˜ Islamabad ' as "˜Islambad', which opens it to an entirely new context as well as criticism from a group that we need not guess!
Why the Waziristan deal is a hard sell
By Ismail Khan
http://www.dawn. com/2006/ 10/14/top7. htm
PESHAWAR , Oct 13: New facts have emerged about this year's September 5 deal between the government and militants in North Waziristan that may explain the unease felt by international players involved in the conflict in Afghanistan . Although the agreement secured the public endorsement of US President George W. Bush, western and Afghan officials are privately critical of the deal.
Sources say there are a number of factors fuelling suspicion. Firstly, the deal was signed with militants and not with tribal elders, as is being officially claimed. The signatories are the two principal parties to the conflict: (a) the administrator of North Waziristan as the government representative, and (b) militants and clerics who until September 5 were on the wanted list. Among them are Hafiz Gul Bahadar, Maulana Sadiq Noor, Azad Khan, Maulvi Saifullah, Maulvi Ahmad Shah Jehan, Azmat Ali, Hafiz Amir Hamza and Mir Sharaf.
The first two in the list are top militant clerics and the remaining six were nominated by them to co-sign the agreement, sources say, adding that they were all pardoned by the government subsequent to the deal. The agreement identifies them as "˜fareeq-e-doum' (second party). As the names indicate, no tribal elder from the Utmanzai tribe was among the signatories, as claimed by the government. The 45-member inter-tribal jirga handpicked and nominated by Governor Ali Muhammad Jan Aurakzai countersigned the document as the interlocutors. Period.
As such the argument that the peace agreement is against the Taliban, and not with the Taliban, just does not hold water. One expert asks: "How could the militants in North Waziristan , who owe their allegiance to Mullah Omar and his commander Jalaluddin Haqqani, who is responsible for southern Afghanistan , sign a deal against their brothers in arms?"
Secondly, the deal stipulates that foreign militants living in North Waziristan would either leave or live peacefully. But no mechanism has been put in place to oversee and verify either their conduct or the departure of those who violate the agreement. Over a month after the signing of the deal, there is no progress on this front.
Contrary to the government's assertion, troops deployed in and around Miramshah, except those manning the borders, have been removed from check-posts and relocated to their camps. All weapons seized from militants have been returned and their men released.
There have been more kidnappings, robberies and murders since then as the Khasadar force "” a ragtag, untrained tribal force left to man the posts "” has neither the teeth nor the wherewithal to rein in the militants or control crime, area residents point out.
Eyewitnesses say there are now not one but two Taliban offices in Miramshah to maintain law and order, control crime and address public complaints, a serious violation of the agreement by the Taliban who had undertaken not to form a parallel administration in the tribal region.
There is growing evidence that militants are now more assertive than they were before the September 5 agreement. Recently they wrested custody of suspects, along with a vehicle the latter had snatched, telling the Khasadars that they would deal with the suspects themselves. Nothing is known as to what happened afterwards as the hapless Khasadars merely looked on.
The agreement says that there will be no cross-border infiltration but Nato military officials stationed in Afghanistan have been quoted as saying there is a 3oo per cent increase in militant activity in the border regions. The death of a local militant commander, Maulvi Mir Kalam, and his men in an operation across the border and the capture of 10 of their comrades by security forces is a case in point.
The deal also stipulated there would be no targeted killings but recent reports indicate that alleged spies have been assassinated by militants in the region.
In essence, there are two main verifiable clauses in the agreement: one, that the militants would not attack government forces and installations and, two, that the government, for its part, would not undertake any ground or air offensive. That the two sides have stuck to their word on at least these two points explains the relative peace in an otherwise volatile tribal region.
Equally crucial and perhaps central to this whole agreement were the two other clauses, the presence of foreign militants and cross-border infiltration. It is unclear what additional steps the government has taken to stop militants' movement across the border since the truce. But if the death of Mir Kalam and the reported arrest and subsequent release of three "˜mujahideen' in the Kurram tribal region "” at the request of militants in North Waziristan "” are any indication, the government will find it hard to defend its position that the truce is directed against the Taliban and not in their favour.
Indeed, peace is the desired goal. But one look at the agreement and the situation on the ground and it is glaringly evident that the government has chosen the path of pacification by appearing to capitulate to the militants than take corrective measures to ensure lasting peace. Peace is vital but not at the expense of abdicating state authority, as appears to have happened in Waziristan 's case. Therefore, when President Musharraf said at a recent gathering that "there is no guarantee that it [the agreement] will succeed", it was pretty clear why.
Given the complexity of the situation, and to be fair to the president, it should be mentioned that Gen Musharraf also said that if anybody had a better idea of how to deal with the situation, he would be a patient listener.
But he is not the only player in the region, however critical his role in the war on terror may be. On cross-border infiltration, Kabul is being joined in its complaints by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). With a growing Taliban insurgency and mounting casualties being taken by the 37-nation Nato-led ISAF, Pakistan is coming under a lot of pressure to do more.
Islamabad may be asking Nato and Kabul to replicate the peace pact with the Taliban in Afghanistan but it will be difficult to push this argument along "” as Pakistan has sought to "” by citing considerations of Pushtun nationalism and a possible sense of deprivation.
Half of the Afghan parliament is Pushtun, and except for foreign minister Rangin Dadfar Spanta and interior minister Zarar Maqbal, Pushtuns hold all the powerful positions in the cabinet. President Hamid Karzai is, of course, also a Pushtun. They are also fairly well represented in the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police, so to suggest that Pushtuns face alienation in Afghanistan would be a misrepresentation of the ground realities in that country. The days of the Tajik-led Northern Alliance 's dominance are over.
Indeed, Pakistan would do well to avoid using the ethnic card. It is a double-edged weapon that can cut both ways, considering the growing sense of deprivation amongst the smaller provinces at home.
It would also be unfair to liken the Taliban's resistance to a Pushtun uprising. This view betrays a lack of understanding of contemporary Pushtun society. Ethnic Pushtuns they are, but the Taliban have never espoused any nationalist ideology. Theirs is not a nationalist struggle; their resistance is fired by a desire to wage "˜jihad and defeat the infidels'.
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