Al-Qaeda - Taliban nexus a worry for USA

Asif Haroon Raja

Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda are the products of Afghan Jihad against Soviet forces created and supported by CIA. Afghan Taliban led by Mullah Omar and Osama led Al-Qaeda are allies despite having conflicting agendas. Former are nationalist Islamists wanting to liberate their country from foreign occupation. They do not have an agenda to harm any other country but are aggrieved since they were ditched by Americans after using them as canon fodder to defeat Soviet forces and then deprived of their rule, rendered homeless and declared as outcasts despite having no connection with 9/11.

The al-Qaeda too has its own set of grievances against USA and a strong validation to fight the Americans. It had been misused by CIA during Afghan Jihad and then charge sheeted, hounded and persecuted ruthlessly without establishing its link with 9/11. Osama and his men who had fought the Soviet forces shoulder to shoulder with afghan Mujahideen for eight years developed close comradeship with them. Notwithstanding his wholehearted participation in Afghan war, his agenda was liberation of Palestine from cruel clutches of Israel and to rid Saudi Arabia of kingship.

Since the US backs Israel as well as Saudi leadership, hence al-Qaeda which has now attained a long arm and established bases within Muslim world with its main base in Arabian Peninsula and is also aligned with anti-western elements within western countries has stood up against US imperialism.

When Osama was forced to exit from Sudan in March 1996, he moved to Afghanistan and settled down with his family in Jalalabad with the help of his war associates Younis Khalis and Jallaludin Haqqani. He brought with him his wealth as well. By that time the Taliban had wrested control over 90% territory. Only Panjsher valley in north was still with Ahmad Shah Masood led Northern Alliance (NA). He later shifted to Kandahar and provided full monetary assistance to impoverished Taliban regime put under harsh sanctions by USA and western countries. He was politely restrained from giving anti-Saudi interviews to media since Riyadh was among the three that had recognized Taliban regime. He was treated as a special guest because of his invaluable services rendered in hard times and their camaraderie grew further since both were victims of USA and shared common perception that America was deceitful and dishonest.

Self centered USA instead of winning over Mullah Omar and his Shura and convincing them to detach themselves from al-Qaeda, ignored their sacrifices and punished them and opted to support minority NA. US tomahawk cruise missile strikes on 20 August 1998 on al-Qaeda camps in Khost under orders of Centcom commander Gen Zinni failed to hit Osama but drew the two entities closer to each other. UN sanctions imposed in November 1999 antagonized the Taliban and they vowed to protect their guest at all cost. During Mullah Omar-Lt Gen Mahmud (then DG ISI) meeting in Kabul on 17 September 2001, Omar agreed to form a court comprising Islamic religious scholars to try Osama provided USA was prepared to present evidence of his complicity in 9/11 terrorist attacks in USA. He also agreed to hand over Osama to Saudi Arabia provided a neutral court took up the case but the offer was rudely spurned by USA since it neither had any proof nor any intention to try Osama in an open court of law. Under such circumstances, expecting Taliban Shura wedded to Pakhtunwali code to hand over Osama to US authorities without furnishing any proof was sheer arrogance.

By end September, US and other coalition forces completed their mobilization and were making final preparations for the assault. Other than setting up military bases in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, three air bases were acquired in Balochistan and a command post was set up at Jacobabad airbase. After toppling the Taliban regime the Taliban and al-Qaeda hiding in Tora Bora caves were ruthlessly bombed in December 2001. However, they managed to sneak out from hellfire unscathed. During their period of exile when they were hounded by CIA, FBI and ISI, they retained links and pledged to fight the common enemy to the end that had devastated Afghanistan.

When US led coalition forces occupied Iraq in May 2003 after ruining the country and displacing tens of thousands, it gave a genuine cause to al-Qaeda to join Iraqi resistance forces since the new battleground was closer to its chief objective Palestine. Given the cause particularly after it was established that the US and UK had leveled false charges, it became easier for al-Qaeda to recruit fighters and suicide bombers from within Arabian Peninsula in large numbers. Revelation of complicity of Jews and US neo-cons in masterminding 9/11 to crush Islamists and harm Islam together with news of tales of torture in Guantanamo Bay and Abu Gharib prisons intensified hatred for America. Strength of suicide bombers waiting for their turn kept increasing. Unabated massacre of Iraqis and Afghans and disparagement of Taliban and al-Qaeda by western media presenting them as monsters gave the hunted parties a strong reason to continue sailing in one boat. Therefore, to crib as to why the Taliban continue to keep such troublesome allies will be unfair. If this alliance is objected to, then what is the justification for the US to stay together with most troublesome and notorious allies India and Israel?                     

Although bulk of al-Qaeda operatives has shifted to Yemen, Somalia, Sudan and North Africa, there are few hundred Arab fighters still present in Afghanistan and in FATA. Osama in all probability is dead and his number two, Aiman Al-Zawahiri is untraceable. Unlike in 1980s and 1990s when Osama and other Arab fighters used to provide funds to finance Jihad and support Taliban’s day to day requirements, al-Qaeda today is cash strapped. Yet there is no slackness in their resolve and motivation to fight US-Nato forces. The Taliban have undiminished resolve as well as cash in hand earned through donations and drug trade to pay salaries to their fighters as well as al-Qaeda fighters. The US has been trying to break the nexus between al-Qaeda and Taliban by making overtures to Taliban since 2007 but so far the nexus has remained intact. Notwithstanding that al-Qaeda’s contribution to the Taliban war effort is token, however, one of the things that keep al-Qaeda viable is its association with Afghan conflict.   

Joe Biden and many among Democrats were not in favor of sending additional forces as asked by Gen McChrystal. They preferred greater use of missile strikes and Special Forces operations in Pakistan, seen as the main base of al-Qaeda. Biden and his likeminded officials opine that Taliban pose no threat to USA since they have not adopted al-Qaeda doctrine of global Jihad; instead, their movement is confined to Afghanistan and is also directed towards Pakistan. In Obama Administration’s assessment, real enemy is al-Qaeda in Pakistan. James Jones and others have stated that not more than 100 al-Qaeda operatives are in Afghanistan while bulk is based in Pakistan. He added that those in Afghanistan are without any bases and are unable to launch attacks. Suspected al-Qaeda operatives based in Waziristan are being targeted by CIA operated drones and several have been hit but at the cost of majority civilians. 

Bryan Glyn Williams doesn’t agree with this optimistic evaluation and says he has collected reports of large number of al-Qaeda fighters in various provinces of Afghanistan. Michael Schaver also doesn’t agree with James Jones estimates. As regards negotiations with Taliban, some are in favor, others are not. Latter are of the view that Taliban and not al-Qaeda are the chief threat. Categorization of Taliban into reconcilable and irreconcilable has also been objected to by some since they feel recourse to this strategy is bound to fail. But US policy makers are sold to the fond idea of first weakening and possibly defeating the Taliban and then negotiating from a position of strength. Notwithstanding public demand of bringing back home soldiers from war theatres, there is a strong group which opposes troop withdrawal and desires application of more force to crush irreconcilable. Differing perceptions on important policy matters give an insight to the confused state of affairs in Washington. This is because the Taliban-al-Qaeda nexus has put the coalition forces on the horns of a dilemma whether to negotiate with all Taliban leaders or not and whether to exit or not.

Seeing a subtle shift in US attitude towards Pakistan from coldness to closeness, anti-Pakistan and pro-Indian elements are feeling uneasy. Indian and Israeli lobbies in USA are the saddest and are busy trying to rekindle misgivings and suspicions among US leaders about Pakistan. However onset of Pak-US strategic dialogue is an indication that Pak-US relations have taken a positive turn and there is visible desire among US policy makers to bridge the trust deficit and remove Pakistan’s apprehensions and grievances