Essence of Russian Military Doctrine

                              Dr. Abdul Ruff Colachal

                                                    I

An endless debate about defining the country’s military doctrine as well as its devious enemies to fix its policies and also to effect any military reforms has caught the Russian state once again. The controversy revolves around use of nukes. Russia’s current military doctrine allows for the possibility of a pre-emptive nuclear strike. Some nuclear states have restricted the use of nukes including "no first use". Russia, historically speaking, is over conscious about its territorial integrity and hence it disallows any "separatist movements" inside the country. Whenever the Kremlin says something about a new approach or strategy of military policy, western capitals are unnecessarily annoyed and innocently worried. Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, former Federal Security Service chief, threw another curve ball by announcing a new component of the country’s military doctrine. The statement somehow rekindles old assertion of Russia that it is again taking a step back to the brinksmanship and bluster of Soviet-era military doctrines. Patrushev declared that in Russia’s new security doctrine, “We will adjust the preconditions for using nuclear weapons to repulse aggression that employs conventional weapons, and this applies not only to large-scale wars, but also to regional and even local wars.”

Whether or not the USA remians the key threat to Russia, the Kremlin does not like any (super) power to dictate terms to it nor try to invade or attack it. Patrushev said the doctrine would include a “provision for possibly employing nuclear weapons depending on the circumstances and the intentions of the probable adversary. In critical national security situations, a pre-emptive nuclear strike against an aggressor cannot be ruled out.” Many defense analysts, however, rushed to say that Patrushev had not announced anything fundamentally new. “The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack and against other weapons of mass destruction — weapons used against Russia and its allies — as well as in response to a large-scale conventional aggression in critical situations affecting Russia’s national security.” In other words, in combative situations where Russia’s conventional forces are clearly weak or outnumbered, there is a basis for carrying out a nuclear first strike. Russia would allow for the possibility of delivering a nuclear first strike based not on actual aggression against it, but on its own analysis of the intentions of the opposing side.

Piles of Soviet era nuclear arsenals are outdated and the new regime is embarking upon more programs to construct the arsenals more effectively. The Kremlin is clearly trying to emphasize its right to start a preventative nuclear war. Western strategists insist Moscow needs to spell out in detail the conditions under which nuclear weapons could be used in regional and local wars. West question the purpose and rationale of Moscow allowing Patrushev to flash his bravado and recklessness in defining the country’s military strategies and doctrines involving the use of nuclear weapons puts the country at great risk of being isolated in the global arena, and this carries tremendous political and economic consequences that Russia can ill afford at any time, whether it is during a crisis or an oil boom. The military doctrine involving pre-emptive strikes against potential enemies arises every time the country’s leaders try to implement military reforms. It is not easy to make any fundamental changes to the armed forces until political leaders have defined the military doctrine and Russia’s potential adversaries.

                                                         II

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, this “fear-respect” formula has fallen by the wayside. During the 1990s, Russia and the United States experienced a warming of relations By challenging Washington or NATO, many in Putin’s Kremlin would have risked having their foreign bank accounts or assets frozen or seized as result of worsening relations between Russia and the West. It is known, the tensest of the Cold War years are not over yet.  Russia wants to be feared by others— and thus “respected. The Kremlin is becoming increasingly upset that its gigantic nuclear stockpiles have not earned Russia the global respect that it craves. Moscow seems to employ a reliable formula that if its chief adversaries believe that Russia’s leaders are reckless and may actually start a nuclear war, launching a pre-emptive nuclear strike without seriously contemplating the consequences of a counterstrike for their own country could be dangerous for the entire humanity. This indeed turns the clock backward.

The official Soviet policy, which was set in the 1970s and confirmed in 1982, allowed for the use of nuclear weapons only in response to a nuclear attack. That document, however, assigned only one mission to the nuclear arsenal: deterrence of a large-scale attack that threatened the sovereignty and the very survival of the country. The doctrine remained unchanged despite a flurry of proposals in 1996-97 to increase reliance on nuclear weapons in the face of the first phase of NATO enlargement. The 1997 National Security Concept retained the plank about reserving "the right to use all forces and means at its disposal, including nuclear weapons, in case an armed aggression creates a threat to the very existence of the Russian Federation as an independent sovereign state." In late 1999, then president, Boris Yeltsin explicitly referred to nuclear weapons during an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) summit to prevent external involvement in the second war in Chechnya.  Like the 1993 document, the 2000 Doctrine warns about escalation of conflicts.

                                                     III

The Military Doctrine, which new Russian President Vladimir Putin approved on 21 April 2000, was the culmination of several years of work and countless revisions.  This long-awaited document was promised and revised several times since early 1997. The new Doctrine elaborates the provisions pertaining to the limited use of nuclear weapons that were set out four months earlier in the National Security Concept and in this regard marks a qualitatively new stage in the development of Russian nuclear doctrine. The first post-Soviet innovation in nuclear policy was introduced in the 1993 Doctrine, which allowed for the first use of nuclear weapons. In the 1993 Doctrine nuclear weapons are only associated with a global war.  In the end of 1999 the chief of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces, Vladimir Yakovlev, coined the term “expanded deterrence” to denote the mission of “de-escalation” of limited conflicts. Since its adoption in 2000, the Military Doctrine has remained the main guidance for Russia's defense policy, including with regard to its nuclear strategy and posture. The 2000 Doctrine allows for the use of nuclear weapons in response to the use of other weapons of mass destruction; the mission of deterrence is expanded to include the "military security" of Russia and "international stability and peace."

A revision of Moscow's military doctrine that Russia could attempt a first nuclear strike, should it detect the threat of an incoming attack, could revive the real animosity hidden between the former foes. It appears Russia no longer views nuclear weapons strictly as a means to contain or retaliate in a large-scale conflict. For 30 years, the guiding principle between the leading superpowers was that it is, by definition, impossible to win a nuclear war. The nuclear weapons are essentially a political tool that only exists to contain another nuclear power from launching a nuclear missile. Thanks to the concept of mutually assured destruction, the “war” between the United States and the Soviet Union never escalated from “cold” to “thermonuclear.” The new military doctrine is apparently intended to remind the West that Russia is prepared to return to the Cold War era, when Europe and the United States interpreted the unpredictability and recklessness of Soviet leaders on ideological grounds. 

The Russia doctrine component came amid reported progress recent times in joint discussions between the Kremlin and the White House on arms reduction at top levels. The two sides are supposed to devise a replacement for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) which will expire by December. Based on the doctrine's current provisions, Russia would reportedly only carry out a nuclear strike if it were attacked with weapons of mass destruction or if it were the victim of "large-scale aggression" using conventional arms. In 2003 then Russian President Putin had stated that doctrine. Different variants considered to allow the use of nuclear weapons by Russia clearly suggests anything could be construed as a threat now. Russian commander-in-chief and the chief of the Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev would review the council's reworking of the doctrine by the end of the year. Meanwhile, Russia retains the right to unleash preemptive nuclear attacks if it thinks there is threat to its territorial integrity and can escalate ensuing conflict until its emerges the sole winner. Historically, Russian pride does not provide for any provision to lose a military war.     

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Dr. Abdul Ruff Colachal

Specialist on State Terrorism

Independent Columnist in International Affairs, Research Scholar (JNU) &

the only Indian to have gone through entire India, a fraud and terror nation in South Asia.