By Syed Saleem Shahzad

KARACHI - A longstanding disconnect between the Pakistan and United States militaries is largely responsible for the inability of the "war on terror" to nail key targets such as al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, as well as military failures against the Taliban-led insurgency in Afghanistan.

Former US ambassador to Honduras, Mexico and the Philippines and presently Deputy Secretary of State, John Negroponte, aims to change this by creating special Pakistani units, trained by the US, to go after key figures.

"These programs have already started and will continue at length. Already, many teams of US military officials have arrived in Pakistan and have started basic training courses," a senior 

Pakistani security official told Asia Times Online on the condition of anonymity.

"Under these programs, US Army officers will come to Pakistan and maintain a close liaison with middle-ranking army officers, including majors, colonels and brigadiers. Some officers will then be selected to go to the US, where they will be trained in special operations," the official said.

According to other security contacts who spoke to Asia Times Online, the conventional fight against insurgents - that is, large deployments of the Pakistani army in the tribal areas - will be set aside and the newly trained special operations teams will go after irreconcilable hardline militants. The newly elected government in Islamabad at the same time will negotiate with reconcilable elements.

Pakistan is also to be given a new US aid package in the context of this counter-terrorism approach. The US Congress is soon to decide whether to triple non-military aid to Pakistan to US$7 billion.

The training by the US of Pakistani special forces is based on Negroponte's initiatives in Nicaragua and the Philippines, where indigenous armies were cultivated to further the US's battles. In the case of the Philippines, it is against the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group and separatists on the island of Mindanao. In Nicaragua, special forces were trained as a bulwark against the revolutionary Sandinista government in the 1980s.

The reasons for the new tactic in Pakistan are twofold. Firstly, the Pakistani army does not have extensive training in counter-insurgency, especially on its western borders, that is, Afghanistan. And for years, its strategic orientation has been India-obsessed, in particular fueling the insurgency in Indian-administered Kashmir.

Secondly, the US considers it vital to bring its military closer to Pakistan's. At a senior level, many Pakistani officers have a personal rapport with senior US officials. The chief of army staff, General Ashfaq Pervez Kiani, has attended three extensive courses in the US, where he has cultivated high-level contacts. The idea is to achieve the same contacts for middle-ranking officials as a tool for sharing intelligence and conducting joint military operations.

Despite the US giving Pakistan about $10 billion in military aid over the past seven years, the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan is stronger than ever and the Taliban have found safe heavens in Pakistan. Some officials in Washington suspect most of the US money has been used to build up Pakistan's conventional forces for use in possible future conflicts with India, rather than spent on counter-insurgency.

Under the new plan, any reward money for taking out high-value targets will go directly into the pockets of middle- and junior-level officers, who will be at the heart of the special operations teams. Previously, reward money has invariably ended up in the hands of the exchequer, rather than in those of informers or the security officials involved. This has acted as a disincentive for cooperation in the "war on terror", especially for a military that traditionally has had a soft spot for the Taliban.

Sensing the new moves, Pakistani militants have unilaterally broken various ceasefire agreements with the authorities and carried out two deadly attacks against Pakistani security forces in the past few days.

Some Taliban leaders have made unprecedented calls for the urgent and strict enforcement of Islamic laws, for instance, Maulana Faqir Muhammad of Bajaur Agency has ordered all men in the tribal area to grow a beard. The aim is to spread the insurgency at the grassroots level and close the gap between irreconcilable and reconcilable Taliban, thereby making the task of the new special operations units all the more difficult.

Syed Saleem Shahzad is Asia Times Online's Pakistan Bureau Chief. He can be reached at saleem_shahzad2002@yahoo.com