The vital role played by the PAF to defend our nuclear instalations

The Kahuta plan was made concurrently with the plan to attack Osirak
using the same pilots of the Iraq mission, if it went through
successfully. The Israelis planned to either use Indian airbases or fly
non-stop from Israel to Kahuta while refuelling their aircraft using
airborne tankers. Israeli Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)
aircraft would jam Pakistani air defence radar while the Israelis took
out Kahuta - or at least attempted to do so.

To this effect, India had played its part in cajoling and trying to
convince Israel to carry this ill-advised plan through. However, Israel
was insisting on using Indian air bases but India was reluctant to
allow them such a facility for fear of sparking of another Indo-Pak
war. According to a paper published by the Australian Institute for
National Strategic Studies, ?Israeli interest in destroying Pakistan?s
Kahuta reactor to scuttle the “Islamic bomb” was blocked by India’s
refusal to grant landing and refueling rights to Israeli warplanes in
1982.? India wanted to see Kahuta gone but did not want to face the
blame or the retaliation nor bear any responsibility. Israel, on its
part wanted it to be seen as a joint Indo-Israeli strike so that
responsibility could be shared. The Reagan Administration was against
this plan, not out of any love for Pakistan?s nuclear programme, but
because at that time it was busy fighting the Soviet Union in
Afghanistan and considered Pakistan a key ally in the conflict. It
informed Israel and India that it could not support such a plan. This
plan, therefore, never materialized and was indefinitely postponed, and
rightly so, after Pakistan reminded the Israelis that they were not the
Iraqis and the Pakistan Air Force was not the Iraqi Air Force. Through
indirect channels, Pakistan had also conveyed the message to Israel, if
Kahuta was attacked, Pakistan would lay waste to Dimona, Israel?s
nuclear reactor in the Negev Desert.

Pakistan, however, was not taking any chances. Soon after the Osirak
raid in 1981, then President Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan directed PAF Air
Headquarters (AHQ) to make contingency plans for a possible Israeli
attack on Kahuta. In lieu thereof, the PAF Chief of Air Staff issued an
Air Tasking Order to the Air Officer Commanding of the Air Defence
Command to take suitable measures for the air defence of Kahuta and
prepare a contingency plan for a retaliatory PAF strike on Dimona, in
case Kahuta was attacked. As a follow-up to this directive, a special
Operations Room was established at AHQ, Chaklala to oversee the task of
defending Pakistan?s strategic nuclear facilities at Kahuta and
Karachi. A study of the air defence ground environment of Kahuta was
carried out and gaps and weaknesses in the air defences were filled and
strengthened. On 10 July 1982, a special contingency plan was issued.
In the event of an Israeli attack on Pakistan’s strategic
installations, plans were drawn up for a retaliatory Pakistani strike
on Dimona. The strike would be carried out by Mirage III/Vs. When
Pakistan received 40 General Dynamics Block F-16A/Bs from the US from
15 January 1983 onwards, this new weapons system too was incorporated
in Pakistan?s contingency plan to carry out retaliatory strikes on
Dimona.

In the backdrop of the above scenario, it was, therefore, not
surprising that in the aftermath of the Indian nuclear tests of 13 May
1998, Pakistan felt that there was a strong possibility of a joint
Indo-Israeli strike against Pakistan’s nuclear installations. The PAF
had an essential role to play in defending Pakistan’s strategic
installations and airspace to thwart any such plan. The tensions were
so high that a PAF F-16 flying low over the Ras Koh test site in the
Chagai District of Balochistan on the eve of the Pakistani nuclear
tests was, for a moment, mistaken by the personnel on the ground, to be
an Israeli warplane. The incident sparked off a diplomatic squabble
between Pakistan and Israel, with the Israeli Ambassador in Washington
D.C. denying the existence of any such plan.

Then Pakistan’s Ambassador to the United Nations, Ahmed Kamal told CNN
that Pakistan had reliable information about Indian intentions to
launch air strikes against Pakistan’s nuclear test facilities. Kamal
told CNN that if India strikes, Pakistan’s response would be “massive”
and would “bode ill for peace.”

“We’re involved in this threat and in making sure that it does not
arise because if it does, the world must understand that Pakistan is
ready, that it will react, that the reaction will be massive and
dissuasive, and that it would lead us into a situation which would bode
ill for peace and security, not only in the region, but beyond,” Kamal
said.

As soon as the decision to conduct the nuclear tests had been taken,
the PAF was ordered to assume air defence duties over Chagai and the
strategic nuclear installations of Pakistan, including Kahuta, Nilore,
Fatehjung, Chashma, Khushab and Karachi.

Operation Bedaar ?98: PAF Squadron Roles during Chagai

The PAF operations for the defence of Pakistan?s strategic nuclear
installations during the May 1998 nuclear tests were codenamed
?Operation Bedaar ?98? by the PAF.

This was a unique operation in which all four PAF command sector Headquarters (HQ) were involved, namely:

(a) HQ NORSEC (Northern Sector) based at PAF Chaklala (Rawalpindi,
Punjab) and falling under the control of the Northern Air Command (NAC)
at Peshawar;

(b) HQ CENSEC (Central Sector) under the Central Air Command (CAC) and both based at PAF Sargodha (Punjab);

© HQ WESSEC (Western Sector) based at PAF Base Samungli (Quetta, Balochistan) also falling under the command of CAC; and

(d) HQ SOUSEC (Southern Sector) based at PAF Faisal (Karachi, Sindh)
and falling under the control of the Southern Air Command (SAC), also
based at Karachi.

No. 6 Air Transport Squadron (ATS) Squadron, equipped with C-130
?Hercules? medium-lift tactical transport aircraft and based at PAF
Base Chaklala, commanded by Group Captain Sarfraz Ahmad Khan, extended
the necessary logistical support to the rest of the PAF squadrons that
were being redeployed for air defence alert (ADA) duties. The Squadron
carried a total of 12,66,615 lbs. loads in 71 separate sorties during
the nuclear tests.

No. 7 Tactical Attack (TA) Squadron, equipped with ex-Royal Australian
Air Force (RAAF) Mirage III EAs having recently undergone Retrofit of
Strike Element (ROSE I) upgrades at the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex
(PAC), Kamra and based at PAF Base Masroor (Karachi, Sindh), commanded
by Wg. Cdr. Shahid Mahmood were moved to PAF Base Shabaz (Jacobabad,
Balochistan) for day-night ADA duties. This squadron is now due to be
transformed into a multi-role squadron following the ROSE upgrades and
after being equipped with new radar.

The PAF?s elite No. 9 Multi-Role (MR) Squadron ?Griffins? (falling
under No. 34 Wing led by Grp. Capt. Shahid Shigri), equipped with
F-16As, commanded by Wg. Cdr. Azher Hasan, was deployed at PAF Samungli
(Quetta, Balochistan) on 27 May 1998 to provide night-time air defence
cover to the nuclear test sites at Ras Koh and Kharan.

No. 11 MR Squadron “Arrows” (No. 34 Wing), equipped with F-16A/Bs
commanded by Gp. Capt. Akhtar H. Bukhari was moved to PAF Shabaz for
day-night ADA duties on 24 May 1998.

No. 14 MR Squadron ?The Tail Choppers?, equipped with F-7P aircraft and
based at PAF Sargodha, commanded by Wg. Cdr. M. Jamshaid Khan, was
deployed at PAF Base Chaklala for the point defence of KRL, Kahuta;
PINSTECH, Nilore and NDC, Fatehjung.

No. 17 Air Superiority (AS) Squadron “Tigers” (falling under No. 31
Wing led by Grp. Capt. Rashid Hasan Bukhari), then equipped with F-6
aircraft and commanded by Wg. Cdr. Muhammad Jamil Memon carried out
standing day-time Combat Air Patrol (CAP) missions from its parent
base, PAF Base Samungli and its Forward Operational Bases (FOBs), PAF
Bases Shahbaz and Sukker (Sindh) respectively. No. 17 Squadron was
re-quipped with F-7PG aircraft from China on 27 March 2002.

No. 23 Squadron “Talons” (No. 31 Wing), then equipped with F-6 aircraft
and based at PAF Base Samungli, commanded by Wg. Cdr. Ghulam Mustafa
Abbasi was deployed at PAF Base Sukker for about a week for day-time
ADA duties. Members of the Squadron who participated in the ADA duties
included Wg. Cdr. Irfan Idrees, Sqn. Ldr. Khan Maqbool, Flt. Lt. Anwer
Karim, Flt. Lt. S. Atta, Flt. Lt. Waqas Moshin, Flt. Lt. Zeeshan Saeed,
Flt. Lt. Aamir Shaukat, Flt. Lt. Ali Asher, Flt. Lt. Nadeem Afzal and
Flt. Lt. Nasir Jamal. No. 23 Squadron is also scheduled to be
re-quipped with F-7PG aircraft from China later this year.

At PAF Base Samungli, F-6 aircraft belonging to the re-equipped No. 25
MR Squadron (now a SAGEM-upgraded Mirage V EF (ROSE II) squadron) and
which were being kept in reduced flying status (hot storage) by the
Field Maintenance Unit (FMU) at the Base were also activated and made
operational in a day?s notice for emergency back-up if the need arose.

No. 314 Ground Combateers Wing of the PAF, located at PAF Samungli was
tasked with providing enhanced ground security cover to the F-16s of
Nos. 9 and 11 Squadrons deployed at the Base.

No. 481 Control & Reporting Centre (CRC) based at PAF Base,
Lahore, along with seven Mobile Pulse-Doppler Radar (MPDR), was
deployed at designated sites till the exercise was called off on 1 June
1998. No. 482 CRC based at PAF Base Malir (Karachi) deployed its
MPDR-45 radar in the Sukker area at short notice on 21 May 1998. The
radar handled a number of CAP missions that were launched to counter
any aerial threat to the nuclear installations. No. 484 CRC based at
PAF Chaklala remained on usual alert for the point defence of Kahuta.
No. 486 CRC based at PAF Chaklala since November 1985 has been
exclusive assigned to the task of defending Pakistan?s nuclear
installations. It deployed its MPDR-90P radar at Pasni, Balochistan at
short notice to detect any attack approaching from the sea. No. 403, a
mobile Squadron based at PAF Base, Lahore and equipped with TPS-43G
high altitude surveillance radar also participated in Bedaar?98. No.
408 Squadron based at PAF Malir, (near Karachi) and equipped with
FPS-20A high-altitude long range static radar and TPS-43G high altitude
radar successfully controlled a number of hot CAP mission and
intercepted US Navy aircraft flying close to Pakistan?s 12 nautical
mile wide territorial sea. Incidentally, this was the same squadron
that participated in the several joint PAF/USN exercises called
“Inspired Alert” between 1994 and 1997 in which the Squadron had
experienced an opportunity to intercept aircraft like the F-14s and
F-18s. No. 410 Squadron equipped with TPS-43G radar provided
round-the-clock operations and controlled 26 high altitude CAPS during
Operation Bedaar?98. No. 4091 Squadron based at Kirana Hills near
Sargodha and equipped with Siemens MPDR-90 low-level static radar
located at a height of 1,600 feet, provided a surveillance capability
for the point defence of Sargodha Air Base and the Central Ammunition
Depot (CAD) with its ability to detect aircraft flying at low level at
extended ranges.

No. 541 Squadron, a mobile Surface-to-Air-Missile (SAM) squadron based
at PAF Chaklala, and equipped with Crotale 2000 performed its duties
for the point defence of Kahuta. No. 904 Squadron, based at Murree and
equipped with MPDR-90S radar provided both independent and hooked-up
mode operations with No. 486 CRC by providing early warning on low and
medium level ingressing aircraft towards the national vital points from
Indian-occupied Jammu & Kashmir. No. 451 Squadron, a mobile SAM
squadron based at PAF Chaklala, and equipped with the Crotale 2000 SAM
system provided air defence to the Kahuta and Nilore area. No. 454
Squadron, a mobile SAM squadron based PAF Chaklala, and equipped with
the Crotale 2000 SAM system provided air defence cover to the national
vital points. No. 455 Squadron, a mobile SAM squadron, deployed in the
Kilo area and equipped with the Crotale 4000 SAM system provided air
defence cover to the national vital points. No. 242 Squadron, a mobile
SAM squadron, based at PAF Base Rafiqui, and equipped with the French
Mistral SAM system provided air defence cover to PAF air bases. No.471
Squadron, a SAM squadron, based at PAF Chaklala and equipped with the
Black Arrow (Chinese Red Flag II) high-altitude SAM system provided
day-night air defence coverage upto 80,000 feet over the Kahuta, Nilore
and Fatehjung area.

It was felt that a joint Indo-Israeli attack could target not only
Pakistan’s nuclear installations but the nuclear test sites at Ras Koh
and Kharan as well. According to intelligence reports, US and Indian
intelligence did not know about the Kharan Desert site, which came as a
total surprise to them. To counter any high-level threat emanating from
the west or south-west, a TPS-43G high level radar had been permanently
deployed in the Quetta area since October 1982. The same radar was,
therefore, used to provide surveillance on all flying aircraft in the
Chagai area.

Dalbandin Airfield had an important role to play during Pakistan?s May
1998 nuclear tests. In fact, two names gained prominence around the
world during the tests: (i) Chagai Hills and (ii) Dalbandin airfield.
Dalbandin is located among sand dunes some 30 km south-east of the
Chagai Hills near the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border. The Koh Khambaran
Massif in the Ras Koh Mountain Range, the site of Pakistan’s nuclear
test, lies south of the Chagai Hills and Dalbandin.

The airfield at Dalbandin was constructed in 1935 to serve as a
satellite for Samungli Air Base at Quetta. During the Second World War,
it was made operational by the Royal Air Force in order to counter a
possible Russian invasion through Iran and Afghanistan. During the
1970s, Dalbandin remained a disused airfield. Although the airstrip is
visible from extremely high altitude, pilots making landing approaches
often find the airstrip disappearing from view, with sand dunes and
sand collected on the runway obscuring it - like a natural camouflage.
Dust storms are frequent and cause delays in take-off and landing
schedules. The airfield was taken over by the Civil Aviation Authority
(CAA) in 1985, it received a major face-lift and overhaul, which
provided modern navigational aids, air traffic control facilities, a
passenger terminal and a paved runway. There are regularly scheduled
Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) services to the airport. While
not a military facility, this airfield is available to the PAF for
emergency landing and recovery of aircraft during peacetime and
wartime. During May 1998, Dalbandin air field became the centre of
activity for all personnel, military and civilian, flying to and from
the nuclear tests sites to the rest of the country.

The nuclear devices were themselves flown in semi-knocked down (SKD)
sub-assembly form on two flights of PAF C-130 Hercules tactical
transport aircraft from PAF Chaklala in northern Punjab to Dalbandin
airfield, escorted even within Pakistani airspace by four PAF F-16As
armed with air-to-air missiles. At the same time, PAF F-7P air defence
fighters, also armed with air-to-air missiles, were on CAP guarding the
aerial frontiers of Pakistan against intruders. Both the nuclear
devices (the bomb mechanism, the HMX explosive shields and casing) and
the fissile material (the highly enriched uranium components) were
divided into separate consignments and flown on separate flights of the
Hercules. The PAEC did not want to put all its nuclear eggs in one
basket in case something adverse was to happen to the aircraft. The
security of the devices and the fissile material was so strict that
that PAF F-16 escort pilots had been secretly given standing orders
that in the unlikely event of the C-130 being hijacked or flown outside
of Pakistani airspace, they were to shoot down the aircraft before it
left Pakistan?s airspace. The F-16s were ordered to escort the C-130s
to the Dalbandin airfield in Balochistan with their radio
communications equipment turned off so that no orders, in the interim,
could be conveyed to them to act otherwise. They were also ordered to
ignore any orders to the contrary that got through to them during the
duration of the flight even if such orders seemingly originated from
Air Headquarters.

On 30 May 1998, when Pakistan sixth nuclear device shook the ground in
the Kharan Desert, Operation Bedaar ‘98 had accomplished its mission -
that of deterring any misadventure by either India or Israel to strike
at Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure.

But how real was the possibility of a joint or unilateral Israeli or
Indian raid on Pakistan’s nuclear installations during May 1998? The
answer is that we really don’t know. The threat is of such a nature
that it can neither be overestimated nor underestimated. Overestimation
may lead to minor diplomatic embarrassment, but underestimation will
surely lead to catastrophe for Pakistan. So Pakistan prefers to
overestimate the threat and pay the price of minor diplomatic
embarrassment rather than underestimate it and face the prospective
annihilation. This is not to say that the threat was never there during
May 1998. Pakistan preferred to be safe rather than sorry. Furthermore,
there is concrete evidence that India and Israeli have been planning
exactly such an operation to neutralize Pakistan’s nuclear capability.
It is only the PAF and the risk of nuclear retaliation that is holding
them back.

According to an Indian official, Subramaniam Swamy, a former member of
the Hindu fundamentalist and extremist Bharati Janata Party (BJP) that
rules India today, Israel in 1982 asked him to sound out other Indian
leaders to see if India would grant Israeli warplanes landing and
refueling rights were they to undertake an Osirak-type raid against the
Kahuta nuclear reactor in Pakistan. India refused, probably for a
combination of reasons. As one expert on South Asia speculated:

“First, the Kahuta facility is well-protected and is thus a hard target
to destroy. Second and more important, India expects that any first
strike by India against Kahuta would be swiftly followed by a Pakistani
attack against India’s nuclear facilities. Such an exchange would leave
India worse off, since any potential deterrent capability against China
would thereby be eliminated. Finally, India would be wary of launching
such an attack against Pakistan as it would cause not only great death
and destruction to Pakistan, but could blow radioactive fall-out back
over India. Such an attack against Pakistan would also alienate the
Muslim Middle Eastern states whose amity India has assiduously
cultivated.”

In a meeting in Paris in July 1985, senior Israeli diplomats and a
personal envoy of the late Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi
reportedly examined the option in detail. As an incentive, Israel held
out an offer to cooperate with India on military intelligence, defence
production and transfer or technology. Yitzhak Rabin, then the Israeli
Defence Minister, reportedly pinned a lot of hope on that meeting. But
India, which had not yet forged diplomatic ties with the Jewish state,
ultimately rejected the proposal, ostensibly because of the fear of
possible nuclear retaliation by Pakistan and for fear of a possible
backlash by Islamic states, including an oil embargo against it by the
Muslim member-states of OPEC.

In 1991, India and Pakistan signed a treaty pledging that neither would
preemptively attack the nuclear facilities of the other. However, as
India?s and Pakistan?s animosity grows, this treaty has been rendered
toothless and is unlikely to be adhered to by either side.

In the early 1990s, reports surfaced in London claiming Israel had
repeatedly tried to pressure India into launching a joint strike on
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons development plant at Kahuta. The reports
claimed Israeli and Indian pilots would be aided by detailed satellite
photographs of Kahuta provided by convicted spy Jonathan Pollard.

According to a report in The Washington Times, citing US officials,
Pakistan?s then Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmed had notified the US
government and UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan that Israeli and Indian
warplanes, equipped with long-range refueling gear and operating out of
India, had planned to attack Pakistani nuclear facilities at dawn on
Thursday, 28 May 1998.

It is possible that for Kahuta, the Israelis will use F-15 Strike
Eagles to carry out the actual attack with F-16s providing air cover -
a reversal of the roles in the operation against Osirak. Furthermore,
it is almost certain that if Israel ever attempted to take out
Pakistan?s nuclear weapons facilities, Kahuta will not be the only
target and it is highly likely that the Plutonium Reactor at Khushab
and the National Development Complex (NDC) at Fatehjung, among others,
will be additional targets high on the priority list of the Israelis.