Major Flaws in Hamoodur Rehman Commission Report
By Nasim Yousaf
The Hamoodur Rehman Commission Report
(HRCR) is missing many crucial pieces of the puzzle with regards to the factors
that led to the division of Pakistan (into Pakistan and Bangladesh) in 1971. A fresh
inquiry is needed to fill this major gap.
On December 16, 1971, Bangladesh (formerly East
Pakistan) achieved its independence, following a most humiliating surrender by nearly
90,000 soldiers of the Pakistan Armed Forces. Ten days after the emergence of
Bangladesh, the Government of Pakistan (through notification Number: SRO [I] 71,
dated December 26, 1971) appointed the Hamoodur Rehman Commission to investigate
the events leading up to the surrender of the armed forces of Pakistan in East
Pakistan and the ceasefire on the borders of West Pakistan. The Commission was
comprised of three senior judges: Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Hamoodur
Rehman, Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court Anwarul Haq, and Chief Justice
of the Sind and Baluchistan High Court Justice Tufail Ali Abdul Rehman Zubedi.
However, when the Commission completed its inquiry, the final report was
promptly shelved in order to keep its findings hidden.
In August of 2000, extracts from the Commission’s final
report were leaked and published by “India Today.” Thereafter, the HRC report was
printed in book form by a Pakistani publisher under the title The Report of
the Hamoodur Rehman Commission of Inquiry into the 1971 War [Declassified
by the Government of Pakistan]. As per the contents of this book, the original
HRC report had “4000 typed pages” and “374 exhibits.” However, the published
version of the report included only
545 pages (the full version does not appear to
have been published).
I am currently doing research on the late Air
Commodore M. Zafar Masud (recipient of the Hilal-e-Jurat and Sitara-i-Basalat
awards), who was the Air Officer Commanding, East Pakistan (1970-1971), and
considered to be the future Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Air Force. I have reviewed
the published (545 page) Hamoodur Rehman Commission Report (HRCR) and found
that the HRCR has many inadequacies. More specifically, below are some major items
that were excluded from the report:
1) Air
Commodore Masud’s briefing to the late President of Pakistan, General Agha
Mohammad Yahya Khan, at a conference held on March 16, 1971 in Dhaka (a copy of
this briefing was also sent to then Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistani Air
Force, Air Marshal Abdur Rahim Khan). This conference, attended by many Army
Generals, took place only ten days prior to the military action
in East Pakistan.
2)
Details of Air
Commodore Masud’s resignation and his dispute with the President of Pakistan
and Air Marshal Rahim Khan over the use of force (Commodore Masud sacrificed
his bright military career to try and save the country from breaking up).
3) A
recorded interview of Air Commodore Masud by the Hamoodur Rehman Commission.
The commission recorded interviews with members of the armed forces. However,
Air Commodore Masud’s statement is not included in the HRCR interviews that
were released. It is unknown whether Air Commodore Masud’s statement was
recorded and omitted from the published report or if it was not recorded at
all. If it was not recorded, then one must question why the Commission did not
document such an important point of view (Air Commodore Masud was still alive
when the HRCR was prepared; he died in 2003).
In
addition to the omission of vital details regarding Air Commodore Masud, the
HRCR also ignores crucial mistakes by Pakistan’s founding fathers and the Pakistani
establishment in the years leading up to the division of the country in 1971.
Key pieces of information overlooked by the report in this regard include:
1) The
intolerance and suppression of opposition leaders (including Allama Mashriqi in
West Pakistan and Maulana Bhashani in East Pakistan) from 1947 onwards. This type
of treatment destroyed democracy from the very birth of Pakistan.
2)
Allama Mashriqi’s
warning regarding the break-up of Pakistan during his speech at a public
meeting at Iqbal Park (Lahore) in 1956. Mashriqi stated, “Ye Muslims! Today
from this platform I sound you a warning…In 1970 — I see it clearly — the
nation will be stormed from all sides. The internal situation would have
deteriorated gravely. A panic of widespread bloodshed will sweep the nation.
The frenzy of racial and provincial prejudices will grip the whole country.
Zindabad and murdabad will defean your ears. Plans will be initiated to
dismember the country. Take it from me
that in 1970, Pakistan will be plagued with a grave threat to its sovereignty.
You might actually lose it if the reigns of the country were not in the hands
of courageous and unrelenting leadership.” This forewarning was
based on the mishandling of political affairs in the East wing.
3)
Mashriqi’s various suggestions
to the top leadership of Pakistan to keep the two wings of Pakistan united.
4)
The Bengalis’
resentment of Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah (Founder of Pakistan) as a
result of disagreements over issues such as his failure to accept Bengali as a
national language (see Jinnah’s speech in Dhaka on March 21, 1948).
5) The
discrimination against East Pakistan that led to the total collapse of Jinnah’s
Muslim League in the first provincial elections held in 1954 in East Pakistan.
Given these gross oversights, it seems that the true
intention of the HRCR was not to actually study the circumstances that led to the
debacle of East Pakistan; rather, it was to shift blame away from the political
leadership and toward other groups, including the Armed Forces, India, and the Hindus
of East Pakistan. In doing so, the report completely overlooked the most
unfortunate actions of the Pakistani
political leadership and the establishment from the time that the country was
formed in 1947. It is clear that the HRC report, as it stands, is incomplete
and cannot be viewed as an objective account of the reasons for the break-up of
the country in 1971.
The recent general elections provide some hope for a
new Pakistan. But a new
Pakistan requires a fundamental rethinking of every major institution in the
country and a correction of the nation’s flawed educational syllabus and
concocted history books. This massive overhaul can take place only when the
masses are provided with unbiased knowledge
of the nation’s history, the mistakes of its founding fathers, the opposing
views of Jinnah’s contemporaries (including Allama Mashriqi), and how the
country’s democratic institutions were eroded from the very outset. Therefore,
the new Government must reopen the inquiry and appoint a new commission to look
into the break-up of the nation in 1971. It should empower this commission to
write openly without reservation and examine all issues comprehensively
(including the points mentioned in this article), from 1947 to 1971. This new
report would enable the nation to turn the page on a deplorable and depressing
period in its history and serve as an extremely important step towards avoiding
another break-up of the nation.
Note:
The author invites information and photos from the public about Air Commodore
Zafar Masud and his role as the Air Officer Commanding, East Pakistan
(1970-1971). The author can be reached via Facebook or by sending a message to infomashriqi@yahoo.com.
Nasim Yousaf, a scholar and historian,
is committed to uncovering the true facts in South Asian history. Thus far, he has
written ten books along with many articles. His works are a valuable
contribution to the historiography of the Indian sub-continent and have
provided new dimensions to India’s partition episode. Currently, he is working
on additional books and articles, including one on Air
Commodore Zafar Masud.
Copyright © 2013 Nasim Yousaf
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