ASA. Your letter is that of a concerned Pakistani and deserves a detailed reply.

In Pakistan we believe several things that are factually untrue or utterly illogical. We hold beliefs that remain in circulation without scrutiny or evidence and over time become a part of conventional wisdom. But these are untruths, half truths or the propaganda of foreign enemies or anti-state elements within Pakistan . The phenomenon that: "˜Half truths are like half bricks; one can throw them farther', operates in Pakistan with abandon. The result is that we Pakistanis disown our credits and eagerly embrace all discredits. Your letter contains several points that are a part of "˜conventional wisdom' that started life as subversive propaganda. Let me explain.

1. In East Pakistan we were faced with a political insurrection that started as the "˜language' problem but continued even after Bengali was recognised as a national language. We did not understand or acknowledge that it was the beginning of the onslaught of ethnic nationalism that undermined the very basis of Pakistan "“ the Two Nation Theory. The East Pakistanis had suffered at the hands of the Hindus much more than the West Pakistanis. If ethnic nationalism could be embraced by them, there was no other area that was safe from its subversive influence. The Muslim League "“ the custodian of the Two Nation Theory - was split and weakened by intrigue. There was no effective custodian of the polity of Pakistan , which gave the military under General Ayub Khan to step in. He gave the country a new Constitution and Pakistan enjoyed a long period of stability and prosperity. But he had to resign in the face widespread agitation when he tried to amend the Constitution to secure a third term as President.

2.The political classes were sidelined for too long and were angry and restless. Educated in the school of "˜dushmanati siyasat' in their local constituencies they were attracted by the slogan of "˜provincial autonomy' and "˜opposition to military rule'. The ethnic nationalists capitalised on this mass conversion to their ideas and began to dominate the national political scene. In East Pakistan , the Awami League won a landslide victory and the NAP won big in NWFP and Balochistan. India had recruited Sheikh Mujib to its cause and provided funds to him generously that helped him win. We knew all the details of his treachery but Ayub Khan had been in power too long and the people were more eager to get him out rather than deal with traitors. The rest is history. India invaded East Pakistan that had suffered months of physical isolation and insurrection. The defeat in East Pakistan came as relief also in West Pakistan . The public thought it was "˜good riddance' and that opinion has not changed.

3. Pakistan was fortunate that a new party - the PPP under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto "“ had emerged as the flag bearer of the polity of Pakistan . It won in Sindh and the Punjab . He had problems with NAP rule in the NWFP and Balochistan but he was able to deal with them. We thought we had left all our problems behind. But Late ZAB appeared to have a secular agenda. That gave the religious parties a chance to walk into the space left vacant by the decline of the Muslim League. They were able to start a strong agitation against Bhutto rule founded on the accusation that the 1977 Elections had been rigged. Even though Prime Minister Bhutto agreed to hold fresh elections, the agitation did not stop. It gave General Zia ul Haq  the opportunity to rule for 11 long years without ever getting legitimacy that he craved for. He ruled by "˜danda' while trying to resurrect the Muslim League as a vehicle for gaining legitimacy. In his eagerness to undermine the power base of the PPP in Sindh, he created the Frankenstein' s monster in the shape of urban based ethnic chauvinist party "“ the MQM. Ultimately, the USA had got tired of him and we know the rest.

4. Benazir was the inheritor of the Bhutto legacy but she could not deal either with "˜uncles' or satisfy the rowdy "˜workers' with high hopes. More important, the remnants of Zia regime "“ Nawaz Sharif and his ilk "“ literally and criminally denied her rule over the Punjab . The Muslim League that General Zia had resurrected came to acquire the "˜danda' power (aka street power) under Nawaz Sharif that was previously the hallmark of the PPP. Since both the PML and the PPP were well equipped with such power, fortune smiled on the leader who had the support of the Army Chief, or America or both. Benazir has admitted that she had the support of the Army on both occasions she became the Prime Minister. Nawaz Sharif is a creation of General Zia who came to power with direct military help to the extent that the ISI created the IJI for him when he was too inept to make an alliance himself.

5. The ineptitude of Nawaz Sharif was monumental. He felt comfortable only his "˜own man' in every important office of the state. He had his brother as the Chief Minister of the Punjab and his accountant as the Finance Minister. He even replaced President Farooq Leghari (whose dismissal of Benazir paved the way for his appointment as PM for the second time) with his lawyer as the President of Pakistan . He was ever nervous about the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the COAS not being "˜his' men. He went to the extent of the Supreme Court being attacked by his party men and succeeded in removing the CJ from office. He got General Karamat to resign as COAS as he was not ready to put up with interference in appointments in the Army. Then he met his nemesis in General Musharraf who finally ended the "˜glorious decade' of democratic rule by NS and BB.

I have given my view of the history of Pakistan because this is unbiased mainstream view which is at variance with conventional wisdom, which once again, is that all our problems are due to military rule or the denial of provincial autonomy. But there is no Zulfikar Ali Bhutto on the scene to save us from the consequences of this warped conventional wisdom. I was a DS in the Staff College at Quetta in 1971 when the drama of East Pakistan was being enacted. The state of Pakistan acted like a blunderbuss; no one knew what to do. What I understood at that time in service, I am trying to do in my retirement. I will share with you my anxieties and the thrust of my efforts:

1. India has an aim - Akhand Bharat "“ which is almost its polity as well. India is not one nation; it is and has always been many nations and would find peace within and without only after it gives its several peoples their right of self-determination. Until it is willing to do that, all the neighbours of India would remain in danger and under pressure because it must put the blame on outside forces for the several freedom movements going on in India .

2. Another of our neighbours - Afghanistan - is also like that. Even in its most desperate and dire situation it courts hostility with Pakistan because it cannot face the fact that its polity "“ its principle of national solidarity "“ is the same as that of Pakistan "“ Islam.

3. No country can be occupied for long unless there is at least one organised minority willing to collaborate with the enemy. To achieve their aims, India as well as Afghanistan has to obtain the collaboration of at least one ethnic (or sectarian) minority. To obtain some legitimacy for their collaborators they have to invent (and propagate) an agenda "“ often denial of rights, or jobs, or representation or autonomy even after all those "˜problems' have been addressed to the satisfaction of the majority. That is surely the case in Balochistan.

4. It is vital for Pakistan to flourish that it maintained its internal unity and harmony. That can be done by submitting to the demands of our polity and resisting demands that undermine the polity or unity of our country.

5. Since Islam has a universal dimension, to be true to our polity we must stand up and be counted whenever any part of the Muslim Ummah is suffering inequity and injustice - invasion or occupation.

6. I am glad that General Musharraf made the right choice when faced with insurrection in Waziristan and Balochistan. He decided to make peace in Waziristan and liquidate the insurrection in Balochistan. That was the implication of our polity. He did right. We must all support him.

7. The lesson to be learnt from East Pakistan is not that we used too much force. The lesson is that we were not able to mobilise the strength of our polity "“ the forces of its logic and its military in unison - to confront the collaborators. We are doing the right things today but we are not explaining well enough, why?

Sincerely

Brigadier (R) Usman Khalid
Director London Institute of South Asia
www.lisauk.com